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This article describes an innovation in legal education and
speculates about its importance and effectiveness as an educa-
tional tool. The speculations about its potential use, however,
are ones that each legal educator will be able to test individually
to determine the effectiveness of this use of microcomputers to
improve legal education. The computer software that permits
the innovation to be used will be available to interested persons
by the time that this article is published.
There should be little question that any innovation in legal
education that has a significant impact upon the quality of legal
writing truly deepens legal education. Adequate writing is the
very core of legal craftsmanship. We begin with that assumption
and will say no more about it.
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The innovation that we propose does not deal with the aspects
of writing that do receive some attention in the typical legal cur-
riculum today; it deals with a relatively ignored aspect. The
types of training in legal writing that are typically available to
law students include research papers for seminars, preparation
of appellate briefs, drafting of various legal documents, and the
writing of notes, comments, and articles for the student edited
law journals and reviews. Usually, because of the scarcity of
faculty time, only the first of these is under direct faculty super-
vision. The others are under the guidance of various others: local
attorneys, recent graduates who are exploring legal education as
a career, graduate students, upper-year law students, and library
and clinical personnel. Very little, if any, of the training in writ-
ing available in law schools today deals with the logical structure
of legal writing in general or the logical structure of legal rules in
particular; this aspect is almost totally ignored. The logical di-
mension of writing has an important impact upon meaning and
needs to be studied and understood by lawyers, if they are to be
skillful at (1) drafting precisely what they intend and (2) de-
tecting the multiplicity of interpretations of what others have
written. We are developing some tools that will help facilitate
such understanding of the logical structure of legal rules without
creating excessive costs or demands upon the teaching faculty.
The current state of the typical lawyer's knowledge of logical
syntax is well illustrated in a continuing discussion that the sen-
ior author has had over the past two decades with F. Reed Dick-
erson, the most widely published author in English on legal writ-
ing. We are in agreement that frequently lawyers intend to be
clear in what they write. We also agree that, unlike most other
fields, there are occasions when a lawyer writes in a way that is
intended to be unclear-unclear in the sense of containing un-
certainty. Frequently lawyers do so deliberately, and it is the
course of wisdom to be unclear. Political compromise in legisla-
tion and other rule drafting is achieved by intentionally includ-
ing a term like "substantial" harm, delegation of decision-mak-
ing power is accomplished by using "seasonable" notice,
providing flexibility for adapting to societal changes is built in
by a requirement of "due" process. A host of different and legiti-
mate functions are achieved by deliberately including in the text
what the linguists call "vague" terms. We agree that deliberately
incorporating uncertainty into a statement by means of vague
semantic terms is appropriate for lawyers to do. It is functional.
But uncertainty can also be built into a statement by way of the
logical structure, and this is where there is a parting of the
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ways-difference in approach at least, maybe even disagreement.
Dickerson's position as articulated in these verbal discussions
has been that for a lawyer to deliberately use ambiguous syntax
in a legal document is unethical. He agrees that vagueness in the
semantics is okay and sometimes desirable, but argues that us-
ing terms that intentionally introduce ambiguity in the syntax is
putting one over on a brethren. In a gentle way, Dickerson says
that the legal profession is so innocent in the handling of logical
syntax (his polite way of saying "ignorant") that deliberately in-
corporating syntactic ambiguity in a legal document smacks of
entrapment. Admittedly, there is thrust to his position. But
there is also an embarrassing question: for a profession that
holds itself out to the public as expert in the art of communica-
tion, how much of our innocence do we have to lose before it is
no longer unethical to deliberately incorporate uncertainty into
a message by way of ambiguity in the logical syntax, just as we
wisely and appropriately do by way of vagueness in the semantic
terms? The software that we are developing is aimed at reducing
such innocence. It seeks to do so by helping lawyers to under-
stand more fully the logical structure of legal writing.
I. RICHNESS OF THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF LEGAL RULES
We think that the logical structure of legal rules is far richer
than most in the legal profession believe-richer in the sense
that there are a multitude of different structural interpretations
of the terms used to express structure and also richer in the
sense of the vast number of different legal rules that can be ex-
pressed by combining a small number of constituent sentences
in different ways. It is essential to understand this richness to
fully appreciate and respect the complexity of the natural lan-
guage that lawyers use almost exclusively as their means of
communication.
A. Multiplicity of Interpretations of Structural Terminology
Every legal rule can be written in the form of an IF-THEN'
statement like this:
1. Throughout this article, we have used the single underscore mark '-' to link to-
gether two or more terms when they are intended to indicate a single term.
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IF a specified set of conditions is fulfilled,
THEN a specified set of results occur.
The most simple kind of legal rule is one that has a single
condition and a single result. This could be a relatively unam-
biguous rule, such as:
No child shall be admitted to the Apollo theater.
which can be expressed in IF-THEN form as:
IF a person is a child,
THEN that person shall not be admitted to the Apollo
theater.
We say "relatively" unambiguous, because there is some ques-
tion as to whether the statement says anything about nonchil-
dren being admitted. It seems relatively clear, however, that this
rule is only saying something about children's nonadmissibility
and not saying anything about admissibility in general.
1. Structural ambiguity and semantic vagueness- But this
relative lack of structural ambiguity does not mean that there is
no uncertainty in the rule. It clearly does contain some semantic
vagueness. For example, how old does a person have to be in
order to no longer be a child for purposes of the Apollo theater
admissibility rule? Further, what does it mean to be "admitted
to the Apollo theater"? Can one buy a drink of liquor at inter-
mission, use the lavatory facilities, or view the performance of
the play without being "admitted"? These are semantic uncer-
tainties; they are questions of vagueness, not matters of syntac-
tic ambiguity. (We are using the terms 'syntax' and 'structure'
interchangeably.) All rules will contain some degree of semantic
vagueness, but some may be completely free of structural ambi-
guity. It should be said, however, that in our experience the un-
certainties in legal rules that are there by way of semantic
vagueness frequently seem to be ones that are deliberately put
there, while the uncertainties that are introduced by structural
ambiguity appear to be almost always inadvertent, rather than
intentional. It is removal of these inadvertent uncertainties in
legal writing that we are seeking to achieve by improving legal
education so that lawyers are sensitive to the problems involving
such uncertainties and how to deal with them. The program of
instruction involving a microcomputer that we are developing is
aimed at helping law students and lawyers to deal competently
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with matters of logical structure in expressing and interpreting
legal rules.
2. Structural ambiguity between sentences: descriptive-
While some simple rules can be relatively unambiguous, other
simple rules involve extensive structural ambiguity. For
example:
A child shall not be admitted to the Apollo theater unless
the child is accompanied by an adult.
which could be interpreted as saying:
(1) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the child shall not be admitted to the Apollo
theater
(and this interpretation of the rule does not say any-
thing about what happens when an adult does accom-
pany the child).
or as saying:
(2) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the child shall not be admitted to the Apollo
theater,
AND
IF the child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the child may be admitted to the Apollo
theater.
or as saying:
(3) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the child shall not be admitted to the Apollo
theater,
AND
IF the child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the child shall be admitted to the Apollo
theater.
The structural ambiguity that permits each of these three dif-
ferent interpretations as possibilities for what the rule says is an
ambiguity about the logical relationship intended to be ex-
pressed by the term 'unless' between the two complete
sentences:




the child is accompanied by an adult.
Hence, we refer to such ambiguity as a "between-sentence"
structural ambiguity in contrast to "within-sentence" structural
ambiguity, which will be exemplified later.
The first ambiguity about the term 'unless' is whether it is
meant to express a single conditional (a single IF-THEN state-
ment) or to express a biconditional (a pair of IF-THEN state-
ments). Interpretation (1) is the only single conditional interpre-
tation; both (2) and (3) are biconditional interpretations.
The second ambiguity involves the implied 'not' that is im-
bedded in the 'unless'. The question is whether it is meant to
precede the entire first sentence or to be distributed within that
sentence. If the implied 'not' is interpreted as preceding the en-
tire sentence, then the result is:
it is not so that the child shall not be admitted to the
Apollo theater
which is the same as:
it is not so that the child must not be admitted to the
Apollo theater
which is the same as:
the child may be admitted to the Apollo theater
which results in interpretation (2).
On the other hand, if the implied 'not' is distributed within that
first sentence to produce:
the child shall not not be admitted to the Apollo theater
which is the same as:
the child shall be admitted to the Apollo theater
the result is interpretation (3).
3. Structural ambiguity within sentences: deontic- In addi-
tion to the simple rules that are relatively unambiguous and
those that involve extensive structural ambiguity, there are
other simple ones that involve even more extensive ambiguity;
they involve within-sentence ambiguity in addition to between-
sentence ambiguity. The following simple rule is one that in-
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volves such within-sentence ambiguity:
The ushers (who take tickets) shall not admit a child to
the Apollo theater unless the child is accompanied by an
adult.
There are three between-sentence structural interpretations that
are similar to the (1), (2), and (3) interpretations of the second
simple rule above:
(4) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall not admit the child to the
Apollo theater
(and this interpretation of the rule does not say any-
thing about what happens when an adult does accom-
pany the child).
(5) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall not admit the child to the
Apollo theater
AND
IF the child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers may admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
(6) IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN ushers shall not admit the child to the Apollo
theater
AND
IF the child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
4. Structural ambiguity within sentences: Hohfeldian-
There are also multiple interpretations due to the within-sen-
tence structural ambiguity of the term 'shall' in the last sentence
of interpretation (6) of this third rule, of the term 'shall not' in
interpretations (4), (5), and (6), and of the term 'may' in (5).
For an example of a within-sentence structural ambiguity,
consider first the 'shall' that occurs in the last sentence of (6):
the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo theater.
The sentence is of the form, 'y shall b', that is 'person-y shall do
act-b'. There are at least eleven different interpretations of the
logical structure of sentences of this form. For this particular in-
stance of a sentence of such form, five of the possible interpreta-
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tions are clearly so improbable that they are not worthy of con-
sideration beyond a brief description of each of them. The six
ways of interpreting the sentence in question that seem to be
reasonable alternative interpretations of the term 'shall' are:
a. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have the power
to admit the child to the Apollo theater (and nothing is
said by this interpretation of 'shall', or otherwise pre-
sumed, about whether or not the ushers have a duty or a
privilege to exercise that power).
Here the term 'power' is being used in its Hohfeldian
sense of the capacity to change the legal status of the
child from being a nonadmitted person to being an ad-
mitted person. The terms 'duty' and 'privilege' are also
being used in their Hohfeldian senses. To say that the
ushers have a 'duty' to exercise their power to admit the
child indicates that the ushers have an obligation to
somebody (for example, to the theater owner, to the
child's guardian, or to society's legal representative) to
do some act that would constitute exercise of the ushers'
power to admit the child. On the other hand, to say that
the ushers have a 'privilege' with respect to the theater
owner to exercise their power to admit the child indi-
cates that the ushers do not have a duty to the theater
owner (by virtue of this rule) to refrain from doing any
act that would constitute exercise of the ushers' power to
admit the child.
2
b. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have the power
to admit the child to the Apollo theater (and nothing is
said about whether or not the ushers have a duty or a
privilege to exercise that power), but there is a general
default rule in the legal system that raises a presumption
in the absence of an expressly stated or implied duty to
exercise or not to exercise the power that the ushers
have discretion about whether or not to exercise the
power, that is, that the ushers have a privilege to exer-
cise it and a privilege not to exercise it.
c. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have a power
to admit the child to the Apollo theater and a duty to
somebody to exercise that power.
2. For the original statement of the Hohfeldian system of fundamental legal concep-
tions, see Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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d. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have a duty to
somebody to do an act that would constitute an exercise
of the ushers' power to admit if such power existed, but
nothing is said by this interpretation of 'shall', or other-
wise presumed, about whether or not the ushers have
such power.
The kind of situation in which there is a duty unaccom-
panied by a particular power, although perhaps some-
what unusual, is certainly imaginable. The power in-
volved in alternative c that accompanies a duty to admit
could be a power to admit for purposes of viewing the
play, that is, a power to create (by admitting) a right of
the child to view the play without interference by others.
But just because the child is intended to be "admitted"
for purposes of viewing the play does not necessarily
mean that the child is intended to be admitted for all
purposes. In fact, the most probable intent is that the
ushers do not have, by virtue of the rule under consider-
ation, the power to admit the child in the sense of creat-
ing a power of the child to purchase a drink of liquor at
intermission, a power that would be created with respect
to adults admitted to a theater that sells liquor. With
respect to the power to admit in this latter sense, the
term 'shall' is being interpreted as not saying anything
and not implying any presumption.
e. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have a duty to
somebody to do an act that would constitute an exercise
of the ushers' power to admit (to allow the child accom-
panied by an adult to enter) if such power existed, but
nothing is said by this interpretation of 'shall' about
whether or not the ushers have such power. But there is
a general default rule in the legal system that raises a
presumption, in the absence of an express creation of a
power, that no such power exists. In other words, there is
a disability. In this case, the ushers have a disability to
create a power of the child to purchase liquor either by
allowing the child to enter or by not allowing the child to
enter, unless such a power to purchase is expressly
created.
f. The term 'shall' indicates that the ushers have a duty to
somebody to do an act that would constitute an exercise
of the ushers' power to admit if such power existed, but
nothing is said by this interpretation of 'shall' about
[VOL. 18:2
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whether or not the ushers have such power. But it is pre-
sumed, in the case of admission for purposes of purchas-
ing a drink of liquor at intermission, that the ushers do
not have the power to create such a power to purchase in
the child unless such power to create the power to
purchase is expressly created. So, the 'shall' indicates a
duty of the ushers to allow the child to enter, and a dis-
ability of the ushers to create a power of the child to
purchase a drink of liquor at intermission by allowing the
child to enter.
It seems to us that of the six alternative interpretations of the
rule being considered, first, the most likely one to be chosen
with respect to admission for purposes of the child's right to
view the play without interference by others is interpretation c,
namely, that the 'shall' expresses both a power and a duty, and
second the most likely one to be chosen with respect to admis-
sion for purposes of the child's power to purchase a drink of li-
quor at intermission is interpretation f, namely, that the 'shall'
expresses the ushers' duty to somebody to allow the child to
enter and the ushers' disability to thereby create a power in the
child to purchase a drink of liquor at intermission.
The remaining five alternatives so improbable as to deserve
only brief mention, are:
g. The 'shall' in this rule indicates nothing about the pres-
ence or absence of a power and nothing about the pres-
ence or absence of a duty. 'Shall' is being used in its de-
scriptive sense only, not in any normative sense. The
'shall' in the following statement is an example of such a
descriptive 'shall':
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, the licensee must
afford equal opportunities to all other such can-
didates for that office in the use of such broad-
casting station.
h. The 'shall' indicates only a power of the ushers and
nothing about the presence or absence of a duty of the
ushers, and the power is exercised by not allowing the
child to enter. This is farfetched for the rule being con-
sidered, but a plausible interpretation of a rule like the
following:
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The registrar shall be deemed to have accepted
the application, if she does not timely notify
the applicant of its rejection.
i. The 'shall' indicates a power of the ushers that can be
exercised by allowing the child to enter and a duty of the
ushers to somebody to not allow the child to enter. This
interpretation involving a power with a duty not to exer-
cise it is another farfetched interpretation of the rule be-
ing considered, but a plausible one for a statement such
as:
The unauthorized agent shall bind her principal
by making deals with third parties with whom
there has been a history of past dealing.
j. The 'shall' indicates a duty of the ushers to somebody to
allow the child to enter and a disability of the ushers by
not allowing the child to enter to confer the status of be-
ing admitted upon the child for purposes of viewing the
play.
k. The 'shall' indicates a power of the ushers by not al-
lowing the child to enter to confer the status of being ad-
mitted upon the child for purposes of viewing the play,
and a duty of the ushers to somebody to allow the child
to enter. This is another farfetched interpretation for the
rule being considered, but a plausible one for:
The registrar shall timely notify applicants of
rejection of their applications and be deemed to
have accepted an application if she fails to do
SO.
The richness of the between-sentence structural term 'unless'
and the within-sentence structural term 'shall' in the sense of
the multitude of structural interpretations of such terms is well
illustrated by the examples above. In the case of the term 'shall'
the eleven alternatives discussed are a subset of thirty-six differ-
ent possible interpretations, which are different combinations of
duties-privileges and power-disabilities. These thirty-six pos-
sibilities are summarized in Table 1.
[VOL. 18:2
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Person-y has a PRIVILEGE with respect to person__x to do
act-b.
Persony has the DUTY to person..x to do acL.NOTb.
Persony has a DISABILITY to create LEGAL.RELATION_.LR
by doing acL-b.
Person-y has a POWER to create legaLrelation-LR by doing
act-b.
The eleven alternative interpretations of statements of the
form 'y shall b' can be briefly summarized in terms of the Table
1 matrix as follows:
Table la
a. y shall b.
1 0 1 2 3 4 5





5 a a a a a a
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We believe that there are at least the eleven interpretations
summarized above for statements of such form. We believe, fur-
ther, but much more tentatively, that a similar analysis for
statements of the form 'y shall not b' (like the examples in (4),
(5), and (6) above), of the form 'y may b' (like the example in (5)
above), and of the form 'y may not b' would show at least the
thirteen alternative interpretations, the sixteen alternative inter-
pretations, and the twenty-two alternative interpretations shown
in the brief summaries below.
TYPICAL LEGAL LANGUAGE USED (AMBIGUOUSLY) TO STATE THE
RESULTS OF LEGAL RULES
Table lb Table lc Table ld
b. y shall not b. c. y may b. d. y may not b.
0 1 2 3 45 0 1 2 3 45 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 b b b b 0 c c 0 d d d
1 b 1 c c c c cc 1 d d d d d d
2 b 2 c 2 d d d d d d
3 b 3 c c c c c c 3 d
4 b b b b b b 4 c 4 d d d d d d
5 5 5
The richness of natural English in the sense of the many dif-
ferent interpretations that are possible for the structural terms
used, both between-sentence structural terms and within-sen-
tence structural terms, has been well illustrated in the discussion
and examples above. Now, we turn to the richness in the other
sense-the surprisingly many different legal rules that can be
expressed by combining a small number of conditions and re-
sults in different ways.
B. Number of Possible Legal Rules with Same Conditions
and Results
1. Single condition rules- For the most simple rule of all, a
statement consisting of a single condition and a single result, the
number of different rules that it is possible to express depends
upon the type of structure being analyzed. The number of differ-
ent rules possible for the same conditions and the same results
in rules of greater complexity also depends upon the three types
of structure: descriptive structure, deontic structure, and
Hohfeldian structure. For the descriptive structure, the results
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are analyzed as whole sentences without any breakdown into de-
ontic or Hohfeldian elements. To illustrate these three types of
structure, consider the Rule (4) discussed above. Rule (4) ana-
lyzed descriptively is merely two sentences connected by the de-
scriptive structural term IF-THEN:
IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall not admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
For the deontic type of structural analysis the result
the ushers shall not admit the child to the Apollo theater
is transformed into a different but equivalent statement that is
separated into its deontic and descriptive components
IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT the ushers do not admit the
child to the Apollo theater.
and then Rule (4) is:
IF a child is not accompanied by an adult,
THEN IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT the ushers do not
admit the child to the Apollo theater.
In order to analyze the result in terms of Hohfeldian structure it
is necessary to add some information, namely, to whom the obli-
gation is owed. The resulting statement could be, among others,
one of the following:
The USHERS have a DUTY to the OWNER to not ad-
mit the child to the Apollo theater.
The USHERS have a DUTY to the PUBLIC to not ad-
mit the child to the Apollo theater.
The USHERS have a DUTY to the GUARDIAN to not
admit the child to the Apollo theater.
and Rule (4) would be the IF-THEN statement with whichever
result was appropriate.
2. Single condition rules: descriptive structure- The number
of different rules of the descriptive type with the condition
a child is accompanied by an adult
and the result
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the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo theater
is nine. The number of different rules of the deontic type is
thirty-six, and the number of different rules of the Hohfeldian
type is 1,296. The nine different possible descriptive rules are:
vO WHETHER OR NOT a child is accompanied by an adult
is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the ush-
ers shall or shall NOT admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
v1 IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall NOT admit the child to the
Apollo theater.
v2 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall NOT admit the child to the
Apollo theater.
v3 IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
v4 WHETHER OR NOT a child is accompanied by an
adult,
the ushers shall NOT admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
v5 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall NOT admit the child to the
Apollo theater,
BUT OTHERWISE, NOT.
(The 'BUT OTHERWISE, NOT' in this context is an ab-
breviated way of stating, 'IF a child is NOT accompanied
by an adult, THEN IT IS NOT SO THAT the ushers
shall NOT admit the child to the Apollo theater' which,
in turn, is just another way of stating, 'IF a child is NOT
accompanied by an adult, THEN the ushers may admit
the child to the Apollo theater'.)
v6 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
v7 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,





v8 WHETHER OR NOT a child is accompanied by an
adult, the ushers shall admit the child to the Apollo
theater.
For rules having only one condition and one result, the num-
ber of different rules for each type of result depends upon two
things:
the number of possible values of the condition
and
the number of possible values of the result.
There are just two possible values of a specified condition:
It is fulfilled.
It is not fulfilled.
Descriptive results have three possible values:
A specified outcome is indeterminate.
A specified outcome does not occur.
A specified outcome does occur.
The combinations of these possible values are summarized in
Table 2.
TABLE 2
THE NINE DIFFERENT DESCRIPTIVE-STRUCTURAL RULES OF A SINGLE CONDITION
AND A SINGLE RESULT
Values of Values of
Conditions Results
fulfilled 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2
not fulfilled 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8
Rules
0 Indeterminate
1 Does NOT occur
2 Does occur
Thus, in the case of one condition and one result the number of
different descriptive rules is equal to the number of values of the
result raised to the power of the number of values of the condi-
tion. In other words,
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V = RC = 32 = 9
where V is the number of different descriptive rules,
R is the number of possible values of the result, and
C is the number of possible values of the condition.
3. Single condition rules: deontic structure- Deontic results,
on the other hand, have six possible values, while the number of
values of the conditions remains the same. The six possible deo-
ntic values are:
0 A specified outcome is indeterminate.
1 IT IS PERMITTED THAT a specified outcome does
NOT occur, AND
IT IS PERMITTED THAT a specified outcome does
occur.
2 IT IS PERMITTED THAT a specified outcome does
NOT occur.
3 IT IS PERMITTED THAT a specified outcome does
occur.
4 IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT a specified outcome
does NOT occur.
5 IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT a specified outcome
does occur.
The combinations of these possible deontic values are summa-
rized in Table 3.
TABLE 3
THE 36 DIFFERENT DEONTIC-STRUCTURAL RULES OF A SINGLE CONDITION AND A
SINGLE RESULT
Values of Values of
Conditions Results
fulfilled 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
not fulfilled 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
dO dl d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 dll
Rules
fulfilled 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
not fulfilled 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
d12 d13 d14 d15 d16 d17 d18 d19 d20 d21 d22 d23
fulfilled 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
not fulfilled 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
d24 d25 d26 d27 d28 d29 d30 d31 d32 d33 d34 d35
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Because the number of deontic-type rules is so large, only a
few examples of the thirty-six possible rules are shown below:
d2 IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN IT IS PERMITTED THAT the ushers NOT
admit the child,
d7 WHETHER OR NOT a child is accompanied by an
adult,
IT IS PERMITTED THAT the ushers NOT admit the
child, AND
IT IS PERMITTED THAT the ushers admit the
child.
d18 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN IT IS PERMITTED THAT the ushers admit
the child.
d29 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT the ushers NOT
admit the child,
BUT OTHERWISE, IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT the
ushers admit the child.
The other thirty-two can be generated from Table 3 in a
straightforward manner.
The same formula applies to determine the possible number
of one-condition, one-result deontic rules as applied to deter-
mine the possible number of corresponding descriptive rules:
D = RC = 62 = 36
where D is the number of different deontic rules.
4. Single condition rules: Hohfeldian structure- Finally, for
Hohfeldian results the number of values of conditions remains
at two, but the number of values of results is thirty-six. These
thirty-six values, which are set forth in Table 1, are conveniently
represented as the intersections of a 6 x 6 matrix whose rows are
Hohfeldian privilege-duty relations and whose columns are
Hohfeldian disability-power relations. The six privilege-duty re-
lations of the rows of Table 1 are:
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None of the five that follow
Persony has the PRIVILEGE with respect to
personx to do NOT_b, AND
person-y has the PRIVILEGE with respect to
person x to do b.
Person-y has the PRIVILEGE with respect to
personx to do NOT-b.
Persony has the PRIVILEGE with respect to
personx to do b.
Person-y has the DUTY to personx to do NOT-b.
Persony has the DUTY to personx to do b.









None of the five that follow
Person-y has a DISABILITY to create
LEGALRELATIONLR by doing NOThb, AND
person-y has a DISABILITY to create
LEGALRELATIONLR by doing b.
Person-y has a DISABILITY to create
LEGALRELATIONLR by doing NOT-b.
Person-y has a DISABILITY to create
LEGALRELATIONLR by doing b.
Persony has a POWER to create
LEGAL__RELATIONLR by doing NOT-b.
Persony has a POWER to create
LEGAL_.RELATIONLR by doing b.
Abbreviations
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The number of different Hohfeldian-type rules for one-condition
and one-result is obviously too large to list an example of each of
them. Here is a small sample of the many alternatives expressed
in Hohfeldian form to give the flavor of some of them:
hI IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN the USHERS have a DISABILITY to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
purchasing an alcoholic drink at intermission by
NOT allowing the child to enter the Apollo
theater, AND
the USHERS have a DISABILITY to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
purchasing an alcoholic drink at intermission by
allowing the child to enter.
h71 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
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THEN the USHERS have a DISABILITY to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
insuring the child's safety during the
performance by NOT allowing the child to enter
the Apollo theater, AND
the USHERS have a DISABILITY to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
insuring the child's safety during the
performance by allowing the child to enter the
Apollo theater, AND
IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN the USHERS have a DUTY to the OWNER
to allow the child to enter the Apollo theater,
AND the USHERS have a POWER to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
insuring the child's safety during the
performance by allowing the child to enter the
Apollo theater.
(This rule does not say what happens with respect to the
USHERS' POWER or DISABILITY to confer admitted
status on the child for purposes of insuring the child's
safety by NOT allowing the unaccompanied child to
enter.)
h106 IF a child is accompanied by an adult,
THEN the USHERS have a DISABILITY to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
insuring the child's safety during the
performance by NOT allowing the child to enter
the Apollo theater, AND
IF a child is NOT accompanied by an adult,
THEN the USHERS have a DUTY to the OWNER
to allow the child to enter the Apollo theater,
AND the USHERS have a POWER to confer
admitted status on the child for purposes of
insuring the child's safety during theperformance by NOT allowing the child to enter
the Apollo theater.
(This rule says that, in the same way that theater own-
ers may have liability for the safety of children who
are admitted to the theater during the time that they
are in the theater, the owners may have a similar lia-
bility for children who are wrongfully denied admis-
sion during the time that they would have been in the
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theater-a reasonable rule, perhaps, for a children's
Saturday matinee performance where there is a well
known and accepted practice of parents driving chil-
dren to the theater and dropping them off.)
h1295 WHETHER OR NOT a child is accompanied by an
adult, the USHERS have a DUTY to the
OWNER to allow the child to enter the Apollo
theater, AND
the USHERS have a POWER to confer admitted
status on the child for purposes of viewing the
performance by allowing the child to enter the
Apollo theater.
There are 1292 more examples of different one-condition, one-
result Hohfeldian rules that can be generated from Table 4 in a
straightforward manner. Whether content can be imagined that
will make each of them a sensible rule is an interesting question.
The same formula applies to determine the possible number
of one-condition, one-result Hohfeldian rules as determined the
possible number of corresponding deontic and descriptive rules:
H = RC = 362 = 1296
where H is the number of different Hohfeldian rules.
5. Multiple condition rules- When there is more than one
condition or more than one result, however, a more complex
formula is required. The formula must be extended in two ways:
to take into account the increased number of conditions and re-
sults, and to take into account higher-level rules made possible
by the increased number of conditions. This extended formula is
required for multiple conditions and multiple results for all
three types of rules: descriptive, deontic, and Hohfeldian.
Higher-level rules are those that contain nested IF-THEN
statements, such as:
IF sentence-a THEN IF sentence-b THEN sentence-c.
This rule, with two IFTHENs, one nested within the other, is
an example of a Level 2 rule. In general, the level number of the
rule will be determined by the number of IFTHENs involved
in the nesting.
In addition to the possible numbers of rules for the various
types of structure at Level 1, there are more rules at higher
levels. For rules with two conditions and one result, for example,
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there are 81 possible rules of the descriptive type at Level 1 and
162 possible rules of the same type at Level 2. For the same
number of conditions and results, there are 1,296 possible rules
of the deontic type at Level 1 and 2,592 of the same type at
Level 2, and there are 1,679,616 possible rules of the Hohfeldian
type at Level 1 and 3,359,332 of the same type at Level 2. In
general, there will be twice the number of possible rules at Level
2 as there are at Level 1; there will be 18 times the number at
Level 3 as there are at Level 1; there will be 156 times as many
at Level 4 as there are at Level 1; and the number at higher
levels continues to escalate sharply. With each added condition
there is added another level with the associated possible rules at
that level.
6. Multiple condition rules: Level 1- First, consider the ex-
tension to take into account the increased number of conditions
and results. The following formulas specify the number of possi-
ble rules at the first level (Level 1) for two conditions and three
results:
Pv = (Rv*r)*(C*c) = (3*r)*(2*c) = (3*3)*(2*2) = 27*4 = 531.441
Pd = (Rd*r)*(C*c) = (6*r)*(2*c) = (6*3)*(2*2) = 216*4 = 2.1x10*9
Ph = (Rh*r)*(C*c) = (36*r)*(2*c) = (36*3)*(2*2) = 46,656*4 = 4.7x10*18
where Pv is the possible number of descriptive rules,
Pd is the possible number of deontic rules,
Ph is the possible number of Hohfeldian rules,
Rv is the number of possible values of descriptive results, which
is 3,
Rd is the number of possible values of deontic results, which is 6,
Rh is the number of possible values of Hohfeldian results, which
is 36,
r is the number of results,
C is the number of possible values of conditions, which is 2,
c is the number of conditions, and
* represents the exponentiation operation.
More generally, the number of possible rules is a function of the
type of logical structure, the number of results, and the number




where P is the possible number of rules, a function of t, r, and c,
and
t is the type of logical structure.
Notice that this more general formula also works for the case
where there is a single condition and a single result. The R and
the C values are, in that case, merely raised to the first power,
and so their values are not changed.
In addition to the increased number of rules possible by virtue
of the increase in the number of conditions or results in accord
with the formula above, there is another set of possible rules for
each added condition. Each additional set is referred to as being
at a different level. The formula will need to be extended to take
into account the additional rules possible at each of these added
levels.
To see how rapidly the number of possible rules increases with
increases in the number of conditions, consider a rule that has
two conditions (a and b) and one result (c). At Level 1 there will
be (by the formula):
Pv = (Rv*r)*(C*c) = (3*1)*(2*2) = 3*4 = 81
possible rules of the descriptive type. These eighty-one different
rules are summarized in Table 5.
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Values of Conditions: f Fulfilled
n NOT fulfilled
Values of Results: 0 Indeterminate
1 Does NOT occur
2 Does occur
7. Multiple condition rules: Level 2- To understand why
there are twice as many rules at Level 2 as there are at Level 1,
it will be helpful to understand what some of the rules at Level 1
assert and to compare them with what rules at Level 2 assert.
Rule v54 states: IF conditioaa is fulfilled AND condition~b
is fulfilled, THEN result..c occurs.
More briefly: IF a AND b THEN c.
This can be written as an arrow diagram as follows:
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>-a-b---> c
where > - indicates IF,
indicates AND, and
--- > indicates THEN.
Rule v67 states: (IF a AND b THEN c) AND (IF NOT a OR
NOT b THEN NOT c).







N indicates NOT, and
I I indicates OR.
This rule can be stated and diagrammed more briefly by abbre-
viating its second part as follows:




--> N indicates BUT OTHERWISE NOT.
It is important to notice that a rule that contains a BUT OTH-
ERWISE NOT with respect to its final condition expresses a
rule that is already included in the set of possible rules for Level
1. For example, the rule stated and diagrammed:
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IF a THEN (IF b THEN c BUT OTHERWISE NOT).
>-a --- > >-b --- > c
0
- N
is v63. This rule is different from a' rule that contains a BUT
OTHERWISE NOT with respect to a condition other than the
final one. As we shall see below, the latter kind of rule is one
that is not already included in the set of possible rules for Level
1.
It is helpful to examine the rules for Level 2 in terms of two
different sets. The first eighty-one rules for Level 2 are of the
following form:
IF x THEN (IF y THEN z) BUT OTHERWISE NOT
where x may be a or Na,
y may be b or Nb, and
z may be c or Nc or Indeterminate.
This is a rule schema for eighty-one different rules generated
from it when the appropriate values are assigned to x, y, and z.
Their arrow diagram schema is of the form:
>-X --- > -y--- > z
0
- N
The second eighty-one rules at Level 2 are of the following form:
IF y THEN (IF x THEN z) BUT OTHERWISE NOT.
where again x may be a or Na,
y may be b or Nb, and
z may be c or Nc or Indeterminate.






The number of possible rules for this first and second set of
eighty-one for Level 2 is determined by the same formula that
determined the number of possible rules for Level 1, namely:
Pv = (R*r)*(C*c) = (3*1)*(2*2) = 3*4 = 81
The number of possible rules for Level 2 is twice the number for
Level 1, because the conditions can be written in a different or-
der and a different set of possible rules determined. For the first
eighty-one rules the conditions are written in the order xy, and
for the second eighty-one rules they are written in the order yx.
Thus, there are two different permutations of the conditions be-
tween levels, so there are twice the number of rules for Level 2
as for Level 1. Some provision will need to be added to the
formula for computing the total number of different possible
rules to account for the additional rules made possible by the
different permutations of the conditions between levels that pro-
duce different possible rules. The number of different possible
rules generated by the number of conditions and results and the
number of values of the conditions and results will need to be
multiplied by the number of different permutations of the con-
ditions between levels.
If the number of levels is L, then the number of permutations
of conditions between levels is L factorial. In this case L = 2, so
the number of permutations of L is equal to L!, which is 2.
In this two-condition one-result kind of rule the number of
possible rules for Level 2 is equal to the number of possible rules
for Level 1 times the number of permutations of the conditions
between levels.
Pv(Level 2) = Pv(Level 1) x (Number of permutations
of levels)
The total number of possible rules for c conditions and r results
will be the sum of the number of possible rules for Level 1 plus
the number of possible rules for higher levels (in this case, Level
2), that is:
Pv(Total) = Pv(Level 1) + Pv(Level 2)
The more general formula being used so far to compute both
the total number of possible descriptive-type structure rules and
the number of possible descriptive-type rules for Level 1
P(v,r,c) = (Rv*r)*(C*c)
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will, for this two-condition kind of rule, need to be modified for
computing the number of possible rules for Level 2 to account
for the number of permutations of conditions between levels.
Adding a parameter L to specify the level, the more general
formula will become:
P(v,r,c,L) = (Rv*r)*(C*c) x L!
With this addition of the L parameter to specify the level in-
volved, for computing the total number of possible descriptive-
type rules the formula for two-condition rule schemas will
become:
P-total(v,r,2,2) = P(v,r,2,1) + P(v,r,2,2)
Although these formulas for two-condition rule schemas also
work for one-condition rule schemas, they are not satisfactory
for rule schemas with more than two conditions. Using these for-
mulas for computing the number of possible descriptive-type
rules for specific levels and the total number of possible descrip-
tive-type rules, we can compute and summarize the number of
possible descriptive-type rules for each level and the total possi-
ble number of descriptive-type rules for rules with one and two
results and one and two conditions.
P(v,1,1,1) = (3*1)*(2*1) x 1! = 9 x 1 - 9
P_total(v,1,1,1) = P(v,1,1,1) = 9 (one result)
P(v,2,1,1) = (3"2)*(2*1) x 1! = 81 x 1 = 81
P_total(v,2,1,1) = P(v,2,1,1) = 81 (two results)
P(v,1,2,1) = (3"1)*(2*2) x 1! = 81 x 1 = 81
P(v,1,2,2) = (3*1)*(2*2) x 2! = 81 x 2 = 162
Ptotal(v,1,2,2) = P(v,1,2,1) + P(v,1,2,2)
= 81 + 162 = 243 (one condition)
P(v,2,2,1) = (3*2)*(2*2) x 1! = 6,561 x 1 = 6,561
P(v,2,2,2) = (3*2)*(2*2) x 2! = 6,561 x 2 = 13,122
P-total(v,2,2,2) = P(v,2,2,1) + P(v,2,2,2)
= 6,561 + 13,122
= 19,683 (two conditions)
There are similar formulas for computing the possible number
of rules for each level and the total possible number of rules for
the deontic-type rules and the Hohfeldian-type rules for one-
and two-condition rules. The general formulas for rules of all
three types of structure with one or two conditions are:
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P(t,r,c,L) = (Rt*r)*(C*c) x L!
and
P-total(t,r,c,L) = P(t,r,c,1) + + P(t,r,c,c)
The number at each level and the total number of possible
deontic-type rules for one and two results and one and two con-
ditions as computed by these formulas are as follows:
P(d,1,1,1) = (6*1)*(2*1) x 1! = 36 x 1 = 36
P-total(d,1,1,1) = P(d,1,1,1) = 36
P(d,2,1,1) = (6"2)*(2"1) x 1! = 1,296 x 1 = 1,296
P_tota(d,2,1,1) = P(d,2,1,1) = 1,296
P(d,1,2,1) = (6"1)*(2*2) x 1! = 1,296 x 1 = 1,296
P(d,1,2,2) = (6*1)*(2*2) x 2! = 1,296 x 2 = 2,592
P_total(d,1,2,2) = P(d,1,2,1) + P(d,1,2,2)
= 1,296 + 2,592
= 3,888
P(d,2,2,1) = (6*2)*(2*2) x 1! = 1,679,616 x 1 = 1,679,616
P(d,2,2,2) = (6*2)*(2*2) x 2! = 1,679,616 x 2 = 3,359,232
P-total(d,2,2,2) = P(d,2,2,1) + P(d,2,2,2)
= 1,679,616 + 3,359,232
= 5,038,848
The number at each level and the total number of possible
Hohfeldian-type rules for one and two results and one and two
conditions as computed by these formulas are as follows:
P(h,1,1,1) = (36"1)*(2*1) x 1! = 1,296 x 1 = 1,296
P_tota(h,,,1) = P(h,1,1,1) = 1,296
P(h,2,1,1) = (36*2)*(2*1) x 1! = 1,679,616 x 1 = 1,679,616
P_tota(h,2,1,1) = P(h,2,1,1) = 1,679,616
P(h,1,2,1) = (36"1)*(2"2) x 1! = 1,679,616 x 1 = 1,679,616
P(h,1,2,2) = (36"1)*(2"2) x 2! = 1,679,616 x 2 = 3,359,232
P-total(h,1,2,2) = P(h,1,2,1) + P(h,1,2,2)
= 1,679,616 + 3,359,232
= 5,038,848
P(h,2,2,1) = (36*2)*(2*2) x 1! = (2.8 x 10*12) x 1 = 2.8 x 10*12
P(h,2,2,2) = (36*2)*(2*2) x 2! = (2.8 x 10*12) x 2 = 5.6 x 10*12
P-total(d,2,2,2) = P(d,2,2,1) + P(d,2,2,2)
= (2.8 x 10*12) + (5.6 x 10*12)
= 8.4 x 10*12
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8. Number of possible rules: summary- These figures show
rather pointedly that for even the most simple legal rules-those
that have two or fewer conditions and two or fewer results-the
number of possible different rules for the same conditions and
results is surprisingly large. There are thousands of different
rules with descriptive-type structure, millions of different rules
with deontic-type structure, and trillions of different rules with
Hohfeldian-type structure with these minimal conditions and re-
sults. As startling as this may be for the most simple rules, the
numbers increase at increasing rates with rules that have more
than two conditions. The formulas for computing the possible
numbers of rules must have yet another factor included, which
will multiply the results still further.
C. Implications of the Rich Logical Structure of Legal Rules
Far beyond what anyone has hitherto imagined, the logical
structure of legal rules is rich in this second sense of the large
number of different rules that can be written from the same con-
ditions and results. The logical structure of legal rules is equally
rich, and almost as seldom recognized to be so, in the first sense
of the multiplicity of interpretations possible for the natural lan-
guage terms ordinarily used to express such structure. As the
logical structure is specified in greater detail in moving from de-
scriptive analysis to deontic analysis to Hohfeldian analysis, the
number of different, precisely specifiable rules increases dramat-
ically. What is expressed by ordinary natural language rather
poetically, in a global manner that is highly dependent upon
context to ascertain meaning, can be made considerably more
precise by enriching the natural language with some defined de-
scriptive-type structural terminology. This, in turn, can be still
further enriched to achieve a language capable of even greater
precision by adding some defined deontic-type structural termi-
nology. Finally, a gigantic enhancement of precision results
when Hohfeldian-type structural terminology becomes part of
the language used by lawyers to express legal rules in communi-
cating with each other and with computers. In fact, it may only
be possible to communicate extensively with computers in so-
phisticated ways about legal rules in such an enriched language.
The use of an enriched language will also result in more effective
communication with computers, enhancing their usefulness to
lawyers.
What are the implications of recognizing this richness of the
[VOL. 18:2
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logical structure of legal rules and of having available precise
language tools for dealing with it? The very quality of thinking
about legal rules is likely to be profoundly affected by having a
realistic sense of the complexity of what is involved and having
an adequate language in which to do such thinking. Wherever
legal drafters intend to be clear about the logical relationships
involved in legal rules, there will be more adequate tools to
achieve such clarity. Wherever interpreters of existing legal rules
are faced with such rules written entirely in natural language not
enriched by defined structural terminology, detection of alterna-
tive logical interpretations will be greatly enhanced. Anyone
confronted with the vast number of different possibilities will be
more likely to appreciate the usefulness of a language rich
enough to distinguish precisely among those possibilities. Regu-
lations can be more informative; contracts can better achieve
what parties want; statutes can more adequately serve the in-
tended purposes; wherever better writing can enhance the qual-
ity of legal life, this is a means for approaching that goal.
II. TRANSFORMING LEGAL RULES INTO NORMALIZED FORM
Normalizing a legal rule enables a rule drafter or a rule inter-
preter to express precisely various interpretations of existing le-
gal rules. A legal rule is normalized by expressing its between-
sentence logical structure using defined structural terms. It can
be stated in any one of four different normalized forms: elemen-
tary normalized form, basic normalized form, clear normalized
form, or advanced normalized form. A computer program called
NORMALIZER has been developed to assist analysts to draft
legal rules in normalized form and to transform one normalized
form to another automatically. The deontic and Hohfeldian
structure within sentences can also be expressed by other de-
fined structural terminology in the same four normalized forms.
The discussion of normalization and the game presented in this
article deal only with descriptive-type structure. Normalization
of and games involving deontic-type structure and Hohfeldian-
type structure will be dealt with in a subsequent article.
The first sentence of section 315(a) of the Federal Communi-
cations Act,3 dealing with facilities for candidates for public of-
fice, will be used as an example to illustrate (1) some of the
characteristics of normalization and (2) the process of trans-
3. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
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forming an existing legal rule into normalized form.
The federal rule that requires that rival political candidates
get equal air time, the first sentence of section 315(a) consists of
three constituent sentences that are related to each other by the
following logical structure:
If sentence-l, sentence_2: Provided, That sentence_3.
The complete text of the sentence is:
EQUAL-TIME RULE: PRESENT VERSION
CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; FACILITIES; RULES
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a le-
gally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee
shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
4
The five steps in the process of transforming the Present Ver-
sion of a legal rule into its various Normalized Versions are the
following:
1. Use the Present Version to specify the constituent
sentences of the Present Version to construct the
Marked Version.
2. Use the Marked Version to construct the Structure of
the Present Version by replacing the constituent
sentences with their abbreviations.
3. Use the Marked Version to specify the constituent
sentences of the Normalized Versions and make the De-
tailed Marked Version.
4. Use the Marked Version, the Structure of the Present
Version, and the Detailed Marked Version to specify and
construct the Structure of the Normalized Versions.
5. Finally, the Detailed Marked Version and Structure of
the Normalized Versions are used as inputs to the NOR-
MALIZER program to automatically produce the various
Normalized Versions.
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A. Constructing the Marked Version
The first step in converting the Present Version of this state-
ment into a normalized form is for the analyst to identify and
name the constituent sentences of the Present Version. At the
same time, the analyst also identifies the structural terminology
used in the Present Version to relate the constituent sentences
to each other logically. The analyst edits the Present Version to
produce the Marked Version of the statement by marking the
boundaries of the constituent sentences with square brackets
and giving each of them a short name that is placed at the be-
ginning of the sentence and followed by a colon. There should be
a high degree of agreement among native speakers of English in
arriving at the Marked Version of a statement. In this case, the
Marked Version of the first sentence of section 315(a) is:
THE EQUAL-TIME RULE: MARKED VERSION
(a) If [a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station], [b: he shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all other such candidates for that office in the use
of such broadcasting station]: Provided, That [nc: such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the mate-
rial broadcast under the provisions of this section].
The abbreviation 'nc' is chosen for the third sentence, because
that sentence asserts a negation.
B. Constructing the Logical Structure of the Present Version
The second step in the process of transforming a legal rule
into normalized form is to specify the Logical Structure of the
Present Version of the norm (the Present Version in abbreviated
form). Examination of the above Marked Version to separate it
into complete sentences that are connected by structural termi-
nology indicates that the Logical Structure of the Present Ver-
sion is as follows:
THE EQUAL-TIME RULE: LOGICAL STRUCTURE
OF THE PRESENT VERSION
If a, b: Provided, That nc. (Abbreviated Version)
[VOL. 18:2
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C. Constructing the Detailed Marked Version
The third step in transforming a rule into normalized form is
to convert the Marked Version into a Detailed Marked Version.
This step is the more difficult one; it is more artful and thus
more subject to disagreement between different analysts. In the
Detailed Marked Version the analyst must specify and name the
constituent sentences of the various Normalized Versions. This
is in contrast to the Marked Version where the constituent
sentences of the Present Version were named and specified. The
Detailed Marked Version is specified by editing the Marked
Version, indicating additions by corner brackets < > and dele-
tions by curly brackets I I . Such editing should be kept to an
absolute minimum, however, because it is so easy to inadver-
tently change the meaning of a provision in an unwanted way. In
specifying in the Detailed Marked Version what shall be the
constituent sentences of the Normalized Versions, the analyst
needs to decide which sentence parts of the Present Version
need to be expanded into full sentences so that (1) all questions
about all ambiguities detected may be expressed in terms of
those constituent sentences, and (2) all alternative structural in-
terpretations may be expressed in terms of those sentences.
Clearly, this is the difficult part that requires practice and expe-
rience to do well. This part must be done by a human analyst.
There is little hope that NORMALIZER (or, we think, any other
such program) will ever make these kinds of judgments
satisfactorily.
In making decisions about modifying the Marked Version, the
analyst will want to examine carefully both the Logical Struc-
ture of the Present Version and the constituent sentences of the
Present Version to decide just what the Present Version is as-
serting. Often, there is some ambiguity with respect to how parts
of sentences should be interpreted as being related to each
other, as well as how complete sentences should be interpreted
as being related to each other.
THE EQUAL-TIME RULE: DETAILED MARKED
VERSION
(a) If [al: any licensee I shall I permit<s> any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station], then [b: he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that
office in the use of such broadcasting station]: Provided,
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That [nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section] ...
D. Constructing the Logical Structure of the Normalized
Versions
The fourth step in transforming a norm into normalized form
is to specify the Logical Structures of the Normalized Versions
that will relate the constituent sentences of the Normalized Ver-
sions. These are specified for each Normalized Version by what
is here called the Parenthesized Logical Expression. In con-
structing the Parenthesized Logical Expression, the analyst uses
as input the Detailed Marked Version (to get the constituent
sentences of the Normalized Version), the Marked Version (to
get the constituent sentences of the Present Version), and the
Logical Structure of the Present Version. The latter two are
used to determine what the Present Version asserts so that the
sentences of the Normalized Version can be related by the Logi-
cal Structure being constructed in such a way that the Normal-
ized Version will assert the same set of ideas. In determining the
logical structure of various Normalized Versions, explicit ques-
tions need to be formulated that describe different aspects of
the alternative logical interpretations.
QUESTIONS ABOUT LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE
EQUAL-TIME RULE
The questions below deal with three different kinds of logical
structure. The first is the interpretation of terms that indicate
between-sentence logical structure. The second is the interpreta-
tion of terms that indicate within-sentence logical structure. The
third is how various sentences and sentence-parts relate to each
other, a matter that sometimes involves between-sentence struc-
ture, and other times involves within-sentence structure. The
first two questions deal with the interpretation of the condi-
tional/conjunctive terms, 'if' and 'Provided, That', which occur
in the provision. These are questions about the between-sen-
tence logical structure. The next three questions deal with the
normative (deontic and Hohfeldian) and descriptive interpreta-
tion of the three 'shall' terms that occur in the provision. They
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concern the interpretation of sentence-parts-matters of within-
sentence logical structure. The final question has to do with how
the sentence-parts of the overall provision relate to each
other-in effect, where the parentheses are to be put.
Q1 Which interpretation of the term 'If' that precedes sentencea is
most appropriate?
(A) IF a THEN ....
(B) IF a THEN ... BUT OTHERWISE NOT....
(C) IF a THEN ... BUT OTHERWISE NOT.+....
(In these questions, the ellipses '...' represent the parts of the
provision not being focused on in this particular question. In
some cases, it may empty.)
(A) IF
[a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally




[a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally






[a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office




IT IS NOT SO THAT
[al: a licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station],
THEN
... IT IS NOT SO THAT ... shall ...
(C) IF
[a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station],
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[a: any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office




IT IS NOT SO THAT
[al: a licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station],
THEN
... shall NOT....
Q2 Which interpretation of the term 'Provided, That' that precedes
sentencenc is most appropriate?
(A) ... PROVIDED THAT nc.
IF nc THEN....
(B) ... PROVIDED THAT.2 nc.
IF nc THEN ... BUT OTHERWISE NOT....
(C) ... PROVIDED THAT.+ nc.
IF nc THEN ... BUT OTHERWISE NOT.+....
(D) ... PROVIDED THAT.& nc.
... AND nc.
(A) IF
[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over




[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over






[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the






[c: such licensee shall have power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section],
THEN
... IT IS NOT SO THAT ... shall....
(C) IF
[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over






[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the




[c: such licensee shall have power of censorship over





[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section].
Q3 Which interpretation of the term 'shall' in sentencea is most
appropriate?
(A) [a: ... SHALL(O.0) ...].
(B) [a: ... SHALL(5.0) ...I.
(C) (A) OR (B).
Nine additional Hohfeldian-type structural interpretations of 'shall'
also exist, namely: SHALL(O.4), SHALL(O.5), SHALL(1.5),
SHALL(4.5), SHALL(5.1), SHALL(5.2), SHALL(5.3), SHALL(5.4),
and SHALL(5.5), but these are all such improbable interpretations
of the 'shall' in sentence-a that they are not worth discussing in
detail here. (See Table la and the text that follows it.)
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(A) [a: any licensee SHALL(O.0) permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station].
that is
any licensee permits a person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station.
(B) [a: any licensee SHALL(5.0) permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station].
that is
any licensee has a DUTY to anyone to permit a
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station.
(C) [a: any licensee SHALL(O.0) permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station, OR
any licensee SHALL(5.0) permit any person who is
a legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station].
(This alternative, in effect, says that the licensee fulfills
this condition Either (1) by permitting a candidate to use
the broadcast station or (2) by contracting to permit a
candidate to use it or (3) by doing both.)
Q4 Which interpretation of the term 'shall' in sentence-b is most
appropriate?
(A) [b: ... SHALL(O.0) ... ].
(B) [b: ... SHALL(5.0) ...].
Similar to question Q3, nine additional Hohfeldian-type
interpretations of the 'shall' in sentence-b exist, but they are so
improbable that nothing more will be said about them here.
(A) [b: he SHALL(O.0) afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station].
that is
he affords equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station.
(B) [b: he SHALL(5.0) afford equal opportunities to all other





he has a DUTY to afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station.
Q5 Which interpretation of the phrase 'shall have no power' in
sentence-nc is most appropriate?
(A) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(0.3) ...].
(B) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(1.0) ...I.
(C) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(1.3) ...].
(D) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(2.0) ...I.
(E) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(2.3) ...].
(F) [nc: ... SHALLNOT(4.0) ...].
(G) [nc: ... SHALL__NOT(4.3) ...].
There are eight other Hohfeldian-type structural interpretations of
'shall not', namely: SHALLNOT(0.0), SHALLNOT(0.1),
SHALLNOT(0.2), SHALLNOT(3.3), SHALLNOT(4.1),
SHALLNOT(4.2), SHALLNOT(4.4), and SHALL(4.5), but these
are all such improbable interpretations of the 'shall have no power'
in sentence-a that they are not worth discussing in detail here. (See
Table lb.) Notice also in the original Table 1b, there were no entries
shown for 1.0 or 2.0. This emphasizes just how tentative the
suggested entries in Table lb were meant to be. In this example,
subsequently considered, it is apparent that these two entries should
be added to the thirteen already listed in Table lb.
(A) [nc: such licensee SHALL.NOT(0.3) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has a DISABILITY (has no POWER) to
censor the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section.
(B) [nc: such licensee SHALLNOT(1.0) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has both
(a) a PRIVILEGE to censor
(b) a PRIVILEGE to NOT censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
that is
to the extent that licensees by other federal statutes have
a DUTY to NOT utter obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communications (DUTY to
censor), this provision relieves the licensees of that DUTY
to censor, but does not go so far as to impose upon the
broadcaster the DUTY to NOT censor.
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(C) [nc: such licensee SHALLNOT(1.3) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has
(a) a PRIVILEGE to censor and
(b) a PRIVILEGE to NOT censor and
(c) a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
(D) [nc: such licensee SHALLNOT(2.0) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has a PRIVILEGE to NOT censor the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
(And by this interpretation, the provision says that the
licensee has been relieved of the DUTY to NOT utter
prohibited language (to censor it) and now has a
PRIVILEGE to NOT censor it, but it does not say
anything about whether he now has a PRIVILEGE to
censor prohibited language.)
(E) [nc: such licensee SHALLNOT(2.3) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has both
(a) a PRIVILEGE to NOT censor
(b) has a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
(F) [nc: such licensee SHALLNOT(4.0) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has a DUTY to NOT censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section.
(G) [nc: such licensee SHALL-NOT(4.3) censor the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section].
that is
such licensee has both
(a) a DUTY to NOT censor
(b) a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
Q6 Which interpretation of how the constituent sentences are to be
grouped in relationship to each other is most appropriate?
(A) If al, (b: Provided, That nc).
(B) (If al, b): Provided, That nc.
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(C) Provided, That (nc if al), b.
(A) If
[al: any licensee permits any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station],
then
([b: he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station:]
Provided, That
[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship
over the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section]).
(B) (If
[al: any licensee permits any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station],
then
[b: he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station]):
Provided, That
[nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section].
(C) Provided, That
([nc: such licensee shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section]
if
[al: any licensee permits any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station]),
[b: he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station].
E. Producing the Normalized Version Automatically by
NORMALIZER
When the analyst has completed these four tasks, NORMAL-
IZER can take over to produce the various Normalized Versions.
Thus, the process of normalizing a rule is not as easy as A B C.
It is, however, from the analyst's point of view as easy as A B C
D, where the D part is a worthy challenge.
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In using NORMALIZER, a legal analyst must first specify the
Parenthesized Logical Expression and Detailed Marked Version
of the legal rule being normalized; then NORMALIZER can be
used to generate the Outline and Normalized Version of the
rule. Thus, the interpretation of the Original Text is a result of
the expertise of the human analyst, while the formatting of the
expression of that interpretation is done automatically by the
program. The program can automatically generate equivalent
Normalized Versions that are expressed in logically more basic
form (and also the reverse).
The Parenthesized Logical Expression of a normalized rule is
a statement that expresses the logical structure of the rule in
brief notation. The Detailed Marked Version of the Original
Text of a rule divides that text into constituent sentences and
associates a short name with each of them. The short names of
the sentences in the Detailed Marked Version are used in the
Parenthesized Logical Expression to represent those sentences.
In the Parenthesized Logical Expression, the logical structure of
the normalized rule is presented in a single dimen-
sion-horizontally. In the Outline of the normalized rule, the
logical structure is presented in two dimensions-both horizon-
tally and vertically. In the Outline, short names are used to rep-
resent the constituent sentences, but in the Normalized Version
the short names are replaced by the sentences themselves. In the
Normalized Version, the logical structure of the rule is presented
in two dimensions-horizontally and vertically-by means of de-
fined (and signalled) structural terminology.
Unpacking the logical structure of a normalized rule into pro-
gressively more basic structural terms is done automatically by
part of NORMALIZER. A completely unpacked rule (an ele-
mentary normalized one) will be expressed in terms of three of
the four basic structural terms (AND, OR, NOT, and
IF-THEN) and will be in the form of a conjunction of elemen-
tary norms. Although some drafters may prefer to use advanced
Normalized Versions, probably the most frequently used ones
will be clear Normalized Versions and basic Normalized Ver-
sions. The four forms of normalization of between-sentence logi-
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The current version of the NORMALIZER program trans-
forms legal rules as they are expressed initially into various nor-
malized forms. Doing such transformations manually is ex-
tremely tedious. NORMALIZER is designed to free the analyst
from the routine housekeeping chores associated with the task of
normalizing statutes, regulations, and other legal materials. To
the extent that it succeeds, an analyst can devote his or her ef-
forts to more interesting and difficult judgmental matters. Be-
cause NORMALIZER can generate alternative ways of expres-
sing a given statement in normalized form automatically and
quickly, an analyst can easily produce and select from many al-
ternative versions. This will provide a tremendous advantage in
tailoring the expression of a legal rule so that it appropriately
fits each individual context.
Having legal materials expressed in such form will permit an
even more profound change from a reader's point of view. It will
enable individual readers to each choose that form of the expres-
sion of a set of ideas that each prefers and can most easily un-
derstand. Those readers who are thoroughly familiar with the
defined structural language of normalization will likely prefer a
condensed normalized form that uses definitions extensively. On
the other hand, those just becoming familiar with defined struc-
tural terminology will likely prefer a more expanded version that
uses only more basic structural terminology. The condensed ver-
sions will not be abstracts of the more expanded versions. Each
will express the complete set of ideas involved. A reader will be
able to choose the versions that s/he can read and understand
most easily. Over time, each reader will be learning and moving
in the direction of coping effectively with the more condensed
versions.
The capability to generate easily various equivalent, but dif-
ferent, normalized forms of legal rules introduces the possibility
of drastic change in both the production and use of legal
documents.5
The answers given to the six questions determine the content
and parenthesization of the parenthesized Logical Expression,
5. For a more detailed account of the features of the NORMALIZER program, see
Allen & Saxon, Computer Aided Normalizing and Unpacking: Some Interesting Ma-
chine-Processable Transformations of Legal Rules, in Proceedings of the University of
Houston Annual Conference of Law and Technology, August 13-22, 1984, and in COM-
PUTING POWER AND LEGAL REASONING 495 (C. Walter ed. 1985). The prototype version of
the NORMALIZER program is now available and can be tried by anyone who has access
to an IBM Personal Computer. The program may be obtained by sending a formatted




which specifies (1) the between-sentence structure of the Pres-
ent Version and (2) the interpretation of the terms used to indi-
cate the between-sentence and within-sentence logical structure
of the constituent sentences of the Detailed Marked Version. If
an analyst selects A D - - - A as the appropriate answers
to questions Q1, Q2, and Q6, then the Parenthesized Logical Ex-
pression is determined to be: a > (b&nc). If the answers -
A B G - are selected as the appropriate ones for questions Q3,
Q4, and Q5, then the within-sentence logical, structures of
sentences a, b, and nc are interpreted so that those sentences are
determined to be:
[a: any licensee permits a person who is a legally quali-
fied candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station].
[b: he has a DUTY to afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station].
[nc: such licensee has both
(a) a DUTY to NOT censor
(b) a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section].
With this Parenthesized Logical Expression and these constit-
uent sentences as inputs, the NORMALIZER program will pro-
duce the following Normalized Version of the EQUAL-TIME
RULE:
IF
1. [a: any licensee permits a person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use
a broadcasting station],
THEN
2. [b: he has a DUTY to afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in
the use of such broadcasting station], AND
3. [nc: such licensee has both
(a) a DUTY to NOT censor and
(b) a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of
this section].
Alternatively, the NORMALIZER program can also produce the
following unlabeled Normalized Version of the EQUAL-TIME
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RULE:
IF
1. any licensee permits a person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station,
THEN
2. he has a DUTY to afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of
such broadcasting station, AND
3. such licensee has both
(a) a DUTY to NOT censor
(b) a DISABILITY to censor
the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section.
In this description of the process of transforming an existing
legal rule into one of its Normalized Versions, the five steps have
been illustrated using the EQUAL-TIME RULE of Section
315(a) of the Federal Communications Act. The description in-
dicates the roles of the human analyst and the NORMALIZER
computer program in carrying out the transformation. We turn
now to the game that familiarizes players with both (a) how to
construct normalized legal rules and (b) the content of the legal
rules involved in each match that is played.
III. THE CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE GAME
This game about legal language deals with the logical struc-
ture of legal rules. It is designed to provide practice in the use of
defined structural terms in order to be clear in expressing and
interpreting the logical relationships between and within
sentences used in legal rules. The dominant theme of the pre-
sent version of this instructional tool is that in order to be clear,
language should be well structured. When a statement is well
structured, the relationships between its constituent sentences
are expressed by defined structural terms. Later versions of the
game will deal with the clarity of the logical structure within
sentences.
The rest of this section describes and sets forth the rules that
defined the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game and describes
6. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
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the computer program that serves as a source of information
about the sample legal rules considered in playing the game. The
object of playing the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game is to
enable legal drafters and interpreters to develop skill in expres-
sing and recognizing clear legal rules. The skill developed is
three-edged in the sense that it can also be used for purposes of
interpreting unclear legal rules and expressing intentionally
vague or ambiguous ones. The legal drafter or interpreter, of
course, needs to be adept at all three.
The CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game is a resource-alloca-
tion game similar to WFF 'N PROOF, EQUATIONS, and ON-
SETS;7 the resources being allocated are ideas. Those familiar
with any one of these games will recognize a similar pattern in
the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game (hereafter referred to
as the CLL Game). Different aspects of each of these three
games are present in the CLL Game, along with aspects of yet
another game called QUERIES 'N THEORIES.
The players of the CLL Game seek to construct well struc-
tured statements of legal rules and get considerable opportunity
to deal with problems of constructing complex examples of such
statements. Recall that statements that are in normalized form
are either conditionals (IF-THEN statements) or denials of
conditionals (IT IS NOT SO THAT IF-THEN). For example,
the following statement is in normalized form:
IF certain specified conditions are met,
THEN certain specified legal results occur.
as is the following statement:
IT IS NOT SO THAT
IF certain other conditions are met
THEN certain other specified results occur.
The CLL Game is designed such that each player plays each
match only once. In addition to providing learners an opportu-
nity to practice constructing complex normalized legal rules, the
CLL Game familiarizes participants with the content of the stat-
ute, rule, or regulation being considered in that particular
match. Teachers who want their students to become familiar
7. WFF 'N PROOF: The Game of Modern Logic (1961), EQUATIONS: The Game of
Creative Mathematics (1964), ON-SETS: The Game of Set Theory (1966), and QUE-
RIES 'N THEORIES: The Game of Science and Language (1968). All of these are pub-
lished by Autotelic Instructional Materials Publishers, 1490 South Boulevard, Ann Ar-
bor, MI 48104.
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with particular statutory or other provisions can construct
matches of the CLL Game by specifying (a) the list of constitu-
ent sentences in the statement of the provision and (b) how the
sentences are structurally related-that is, the normalized form
of the teacher's interpretation of the provision.
During each match, participants may ask questions about the
normalized rule being sought. Some means of answering those
questions must be provided. There are at least three options: (1)
the teacher can provide the answers, (2) answers can be made
available from a computer program, or (3) a student-referee can
be supplied with information to provide answers. In many situa-
tions the second or third will be the most practical alternative.
The role of referee provides a useful learning opportunity.
A. Sketch of the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game
We begin the description of the CLL Game by a brief over-
view-a sketch of the game. This sketch is summarized in Figure
3.
(A) The first player starts the process of setting the GOAL(S) by
setting one result as (part of) the GOAL(S).
(B) The players take turns making plays, which consist of:
1. optionally seeking information about the normalized rule
by asking the ANSWER SOURCE a question, and
2. moving RESOURCES either to one of the LIMITA-
TIONS sections or to the GOAL(S) until somebody
a) challenges, or
b) declares force-out.
The challenge or force-out declaration ends the moving of RE-
SOURCES. It puts the burden of proof on somebody to show:
1. what the normalized rule is, and
2. that a SOLUTION is still possible from the
RESOURCES in PERMITTED and REQUIRED
and the unmoved RESOURCES that are
allowed.
(C) The sustaining of the burden of proof (or failure to do so) deter-
mines the scoring and ends the match.
IF the burden of proof to show the normalized
rule is sustained,
THEN the match ends immediately,
BUT OTHERWISE, the optional asking of ques-
tions continues (but the moving of RE-
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SOURCES stops) until somebody can show
what the normalized rule is, and then the
match ends.
From this brief sketch of the CLL Game it is unlikely that
anyone yet has a sufficient understanding of it to play. At this
point a sample match of the CLL Game will be described to en-
able readers to get a little of the flavor of an actual match before
the game itself is described in more detail.
Figure 3
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B. Sample Match of the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE
Game
This first sample match will be presented without any content
associated with the six lower-case letters that represent
sentences that are contained in the legal rule that the players
are seeking to construct. Although in an actual match the
sentences will always be available, they are omitted from this
sample match in order to focus attention upon how the play pro-
ceeds, rather than upon the content of the rule.
The six sentences that appear in the rule that the players are
seeking are represented by the letters: a b c d e f. The logical
relationships among these sentences in the rule are represented
by the following arrow diagram:
>-a- -b----> -d
I I I
-c- - >-e---> f
These logical relationships are unknown by the players. By
their questions to the ANSWER SOURCE, they seek to find out
how the sentences are related to each other. The content of the
sentences will be of some help. The sentences themselves are
omitted in this example because we wish to focus attention on
how the players gain information about the logical structure of
the rule being sought by the questions that they ask.
This set of logical relationships among the six sentences in
this match can be expressed in another way, by a Parenthesized
Logical Expression, as follows:
(a&(bVc)) > (d&(e>f)).
And finally, they can also be expressed by a statement that uses
the defined between-sentence terms with parentheses where
needed:
IF a AND (b OR c) THEN (d AND IF e THEN f).
With some representation of the logical structure of the rule, the
ANSWER SOURCE will be able to answer the players'
questions.
Suppose that Player 1 (P1) starts the match by setting f as





Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
1 P1 f
It is now P2's turn. Both he and P3 analyze Pl's choice and
conclude that it is not a flub and is not a force-out. P3 also con-
cludes that she should not challenge, while P2 concludes that he
should neither challenge nor declare force-out. So, it is safe for
him to move, and he has the option of asking questions. P2 asks:
abc > def
to which the ANSWER SOURCE responds:
NN?
The questions asked are:
1. Do a, b, and c each represent a sentence that expresses a
condition, and are all of the conditions of the rule ex-
pressed by these sentences?
2. Do d, e, and f each represent a sentence that expresses a
result, and are all of the results of the rule expressed by
these sentences?
3. If the conditions a, b, and c are fulfilled, do the results d,
e, and f occur by virtue of the rule of this match? (In
other words, is there a pathway in the arrow diagram of
the rule to reach each of the results?)
The answers given are:
1. No, because e represents a condition.
2. No, because e does not represent a result.
3. The question is not meaningful, because it makes the un-
warranted assumption that e represents a result.
After obtaining the answers, P2 moves the a to PERMITTED.
The situation now is:
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
1 P1 f
2 P2 abc>def N N ? a
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It is now P3's turn. Both she and P1 analyze P2's choice. They
both conclude that it is not a flub and is not a force-out so
neither challenges P2's move, and P3 does not declare force-out.
P3 concludes that it is safe for her to move or to add a result to
the GOAL(S). P3 asks the questions:
.abc > .d
to which the ANSWER SOURCE responds:
YYY
The questions asked are:
1. Do a, b, and c each represent a sentence that expresses a
condition? (The period that precedes the abc in .abc in-
dicates that there is no second part to this question, that
is, it does not ask whether all of the conditions are ex-
pressed by these sentences.)
2. Does d represent a sentence that expresses a result?
(The period that precedes the d in .d indicates that there
is no second part to this question either.)
3. If the conditions a, b, and c are fulfilled, does the result
d occur by virtue of the rule of this match? (In other
words, is there a pathway in the arrow diagram of the
rule to reach the result d?)




Then P3 adds d to the GOAL(S). The situation now is:
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
1 P1 f
2 P2 abc>def N N ? a
3 P3 .abc>.d Y Y Y d
It is now Pl's turn again. He and P2 analyze P3's choice to
add d to the GOAL(S). They both conclude that it is not a flub.




to which the ANSWER SOURCE responds:
YYY















It is now P2's turn again. He concludes that moving c to PER-
MITTED is an A-flub, because he believes that the rule is
((aVB)&c) > (d&(e>f))
so that with one more RESOURCE (namely the e) there is a
sufficient set of conditions a c e (a SOLUTION) to reach the
results d and f (the GOAL(S)) by application of the rule. So, he
makes an A-flub challenge. P3, who believes that the rule is
(a&(bVc)) > (d&(e>f))
also concludes that permitting the c allows the same SOLU-
TION with one more RESOURCE, so she joins P2. Both have
two parts to their burden of proof. Both write the SOLUTION a
c e and the OK ALTERNATIVE MOVE Fb. The situation now
is:
Move
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The phase of the CLL Game in which the players move RE-
SOURCES and add to the GOAL(S) has now ended in this
match. All that remains is for at least one of the players to de-
termine how the sentences of the match are structurally related
to form the rule. The players now enter a phase of only asking
questions that will continue until at least one of the players
writes the rule by asking an ultimate question. The correctness
of the SOLUTIONS and OK ALTERNATIVE MOVES written
by P2 and P3 cannot be evaluated until one of the players writes
the rule. After those with the burden of proof have written their
SOLUTIONS and OK ALTERNATIVE MOVES, all of the
players have the opportunity to write an ultimate question. The
three players write the following rules as the ultimate question:
P1 ((aVb)&c) > (d&(e>f))
P2 Same as Pl's
P3 (a&(bVc)) > (d&(e>f))




The responses of the ANSWER SOURCE to the ultimate ques-
tions asked by the three players indicate
(1) that the candidate rule in P1's question says both
more than the actual rule says and less than the ac-
tual rule says,
(2) that the candidate rule in P2's question also says
both more and less than the actual rule says, and
(3) that the candidate rule in P3's question is the actual
rule.


















Action SOLUTION OK Move
CH A a c e Fb





The match is over and P3, the winner











An entire match can be briefly summarized, as this one is, by the
account of the six plays and SCORING.
The brief sketch of the CLL Game and this sample match,
hopefully, provide enough of an introduction to the game that
the more complete descriptions that follow will be meaningful.
First, a concise summary will be presented, then, a state diagram
account with a more detailed description.
C. Concise Summary of the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE
Game
The concise summary consists of three parts: (1) starting, (2)
playing and ending, and (3) winning.
1. Starting- In the CLL Game the first player starts the pro-
cess of setting the GOAL(S) by setting one result as (part of) the
GOAL(S).
1. The GOAL(S) is/are a set of one or more lower-case let-
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the legal results of the rule.
2. A SOLUTION to the GOAL(S) is a set of one or more
lower-case letters that represent sentences that express a
set of conditions that, when fulfilled, are sufficient, by
application of the rule to reach the GOAL(S) specified.
3. The conditions of a rule are expressed by the sentences
that follow the 'IF' and precede the 'THEN'.
4. The results of a rule are expressed by the sentences that
follow the 'THEN'.
2. Playing and ending- After the first part of the GOAL(S)
is set, the players take turns making plays, On a play it is op-
tional for a player to seek information about the rule by asking
the ANSWER SOURCE a question. On every play a player
moves a RESOURCE either to one of the LIMITATIONS sec-
tions of the Playing Mat or to the GOAL(S) until somebody
challenges or declares force-out. On her turn, after asking (or
not asking) a question, a player can either move, challenge, or
declare force-out. To select among these three, the player will
need to be familiar with the material summarized in Figure 4,
ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS MOVE: CRITERIA FOR ACTION,










(A)llow a Solution Was there
with one more an OK
Resource?-- -- --- move -------




























Capsule summary of strategy: IF answers are no AND no AND no, THEN move, BUT
OTHERWISE, challenge or declare force-out.
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1. If a player moves, he is claiming that three things are true.
a. The mover is claiming about the situation in which he moves
and after the move:
C-claim: Because the previous play of a RESOURCE is not a
flub, I (C)annot correctly challenge on this
turn.
P-claim: It is still (P)ossible for the remaining RESOURCES
to be so played that a SOLUTION can be
built.
A-claim: If I can, I am (A)voiding by this move allowing a
SOLUTION to be built by moving just one
more RESOURCE to the PERMITTED
section.
To the extent that a player remembers and understands these
three claims, she will know what to do when others are moving
and what is appropriate when it is her turn. A convenient pair of
mnemonics for players who are just beginning are the word,
CAP, and the sentence:
That's right; (C-claim)
it can be done, (P-claim)
but ... not with one. (A-claim)
b. If any of the mover's claims are false, then the mover has
flubbed-a C-flub for a false C-claim, a P-flub for a false P-
claim, or an A-flub for a false A-claim. By challenging, the
challenger is saying to the mover:
C-flub. You could have (C)orrectly challenged (and should
have) instead of moving.
P-flub. Your move has (P)revented all SOLUTIONS.
A-flub. Your move has (A)llowed a SOLUTION with one
more unmoved RESOURCE when you were
not forced to do so.
c. When a RESOURCE is moved to the LIMITATIONS section
of the playing mat, the effect upon the use of that
RESOURCE as part of an expression offered as a
SOLUTION is exactly what the label of the section says.
That RESOURCE is either FORBIDDEN, PERMITTED, or
REQUIRED. The Playing Mat is divided into the following
three sections:
FORBIDDEN: The RESOURCES played here MUST NOT




PERMITTED: The RESOURCES played here MAY be used
in the expression offered as a
SOLUTION, but they NEED NOT be so
used.
REQUIRED: The RESOURCES played here MUST be
used in the expression offered as a
SOLUTION.
2. If a player challenges, he is declaring that the mover has
flubbed. After a challenge, either the challenger or the mover will
have the burden of proving that there is a SOLUTION.
a. Who has the burden of proof depends on the kind of
challenge that is made: the mover has the burden on a P-
flub or a C-flub that stems from a P-flub (that is, a CP-
flub), and the challenger has the burden on the other
kinds of challenges. In general, the player who claims that
there is a SOLUTION in the situation has the burden of
proof.
b. Any player except the one who has just moved can challenge
at any time; a player does not have to wait until it is his
or her turn to challenge.
c. After the challenger has specified the kind of flub, the third
player must join either the mover or the challenger. If the
one that she joins has the burden of proof, then the joiner
also has the burden; otherwise, not.
d. Upon declaration of a C-flub stemming from an A-flub (a
CA-flub) or a C-flub stemming from a P-flub (a CP-flub),
those with the burden of proof must show that there was a
SOLUTION with the LIMITATIONS imposed by the
moves that had been made when the prior A-flub or P-flub
occurred. Upon declaration of any other kind of flub (P or
A), those with the burden of proof must show that there is
a SOLUTION with the LIMITATIONS imposed by the
moves that have been made on the Playing Mat at the
time that the challenge is made. With A-flub or CA-flub
challenges, only one of the unmoved RESOURCES can be
used in the SOLUTION; however with P-flub or CP-flub
challenges, those with the burden of proof can use as many
of the unmoved RESOURCES as they like. On A-flub and
CA-flub challenges, those with the burden of proof must
also show that the mover who made the alleged A-flub was
not forced to do so-that he had an alternative move that
neither prevented all SOLUTIONS nor allowed a
SOLUTION with one more of the unmoved RESOURCES
(an OK ALTERNATIVE MOVE).
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3. If a player declares force-out, he is saying that a SOLUTION is
possible with one more RESOURCE, but there is no flub. The
effect of a force-out declaration is to put the burden of proof
upon all of the players (including the declarer).
3. Winning- A Player wins (or ties for winning) a match if
she scores the highest number of points in that match. A player
scores 25 points if she is among the first to construct the rule. A
player scores 8 or 10 points on the attempt to construct a SO-
LUTION if
1) he has the burden of proof and sustains it, or'
2) he does not have the burden of proof, and nobody who
has the burden of proof sustains it;
otherwise, a player scores 6 or 0 points. For complete details on
the scoring, see the SCORING CHART in Figure 6.
Most players will probably learn enough from this concise
summary to start playing the CLL Game but the detailed ac-
count of the game presented in the diagrammatic summary that
follows will be useful for resolving questions that arise in
playing.
D. Detailed State Diagram Account of the CLEAR LEGAL
LANGUAGE Game
The play of a match of the CLL Game will follow one of two
possible courses: (1) the moving of RESOURCES will be termi-
nated by a challenge or force-out declaration first and then the
rule will be detected in the questioning, or (2) the rule will be
detected first and then a challenge or a force-out declaration will
occur. Both of these courses of play are summarized in Figure 5.
The following abbreviations are used in the diagram.
Abbreviations
all ...... All the players in the match, usually three players.
c ....... [C]hallenger, the player who challenges. (She is
either n or o; and never m.)
g ....... [G]oal-setter, the player whose turn it is to set the
initial GOAL.




m ...... [M]over, the player who has just made a move
(includes the goal-setter).
In ....... [M]over', the player who has just asked a question
and whose turn it is to move.
n ....... [N]ext player, the one whose turn it is to play
next-the one to the left of the mover or to the
left of the player who asked the previous
classification-relational question when moves have
ended.
o ....... [O]ther player, the one to the right of the mover.
n,o ..... n or o.
t ....... The teacher of the class in which the CLEAR
LEGAL LANGUAGE Game is used.
t,all ..... t or all the players in the match.
The numbers of the statements that follow refer to the arcs of
the state diagram in Figure 5; they represent the actions of the
various persons involved. Who is eligible to engage in the action
is indicated by the abbreviation that follows the slash that oc-
curs after each number.
ABBREVIATIONS









n,o next or other
player
t,all teacher or all the
players
1 Select the Match
2 Move a Resource
3 Challenge
4 Join the Mover or Challenger
5 Write a Solution
6 Write the Rule
7 Ask an Ultimate Question
8 Ask Both Classification and
Relational Questions
9 Declare Force-Out
10 Default: Nobody Does What
They Are Authorized to Do
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Figure 5
STATE DIAGRAM REPRESENTATION OF THE CLEAR LEGAL
LANGUAGE GAME
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1 SELECT THE MATCH.
Either the teacher of the class or the group of
players SELECT THE MATCH that they are going to
play. Each match will deal with a different provision-a
statute, a regulation, a legal rule, a constitutional
provision, or some other statement of a set of legal
propositions. Players will usually play a given match
only one time. Each match has a unique name to
identify it. A match consists of a list of sentences and
data to be used by the ANSWER SOURCE and may
or may not include the Present Version of the legal
rule. If the IBM PC or some other micro-computer is
to serve as the ANSWER SOURCE to answer players'
questions about the structure of the statement in
normalized form, the data about that structure will be
recorded on a diskette. If the instructor or a student-
referee is to serve as the ANSWER SOURCE, the data
will be expressed in the form of an arrow diagram to
be used by the instructor or student.
2 MOVE A RESOURCE.
After the match to be played has been selected, the
first player, the goal-setter (g), starts the match by
making a limited move. He sets the first part of the
GOAL(S) by naming a letter that he believes represents
a sentence on the list of sentences for the match that
expresses a result in the rule. Other players (including
the goal-setter) may add other letters in later play that
they believe also represent sentences that express
results.
After the first part of the GOAL(S) is set, the
players take turns making plays. At the beginning of
each play everybody except the most recent mover can
challenge the most recent move. Players do not have to
wait until it is their turn in order to challenge. On each
play the player whose turn it is (1) may ask questions,
and (2) must challenge, declare force-out, or make a
move, whether or not questions are asked. In making a
move, RESOURCES are either added to the GOAL(S)
or put in FORBIDDEN, PERMITTED, or
REQUIRED.
If a RESOURCE is put in FORBIDDEN, then it
must not appear in any expression offered as a
SOLUTION. IF a RESOURCE is put in REQUIRED,
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then it must appear in any expression offered as a
SOLUTION. If a RESOURCE is put in PERMITTED,
then it may be used in any expression offered as a
SOLUTION, but it need not be.
After a RESOURCE is moved, the mover's play is
over and the state of the match depends upon how
many RESOURCES remain. If there are two or more
remaining RESOURCES, then the state of the match is
the NEXT PLAYER'S TURN; otherwise, it is the
NEXT PLAYER'S RESTRICTED TURN.
If the state of the match is the NEXT PLAYER'S
TURN, then the options are: (1) either the next player
(n) or the other player (o) may challenge (see step 3),
or (2) the next player may declare force-out (see step
9), or (3) the next player may ask a question (see steps
7 and 8), or (4) the next player may move a
RESOURCE (see step 2), and either 1, 2, or 4 must
occur.
If the state of the match is the NEXT PLAYER'S
RESTRICTED TURN, then only 1, 2, or 3 may occur,
and 1 or 2 must occur. The last remaining RESOURCE
can never be moved.
The questions asked may either be of the ultimate
type described in step 7 or of the classification-
relational type described in step 8. The ANSWER
SOURCE will provide the kind of answers described in
steps 7 and 8. If a player asks a correct ultimate
question, then no more questions will be asked. After a
question is asked, the player who asked it (now called
the mover and labeled m' on the diagram) must
complete his turn by making a move.
Play will cycle through a series of moves or questions
and moves until somebody ends the moving by (1)
challenging (see step 3), or (2) declaring force-out (see
step 9), or (3) moving the next to the last remaining
RESOURCE.
3 CHALLENGE.
A challenge by either the next player or the other
player sets the ending of the match in motion; there will
be no more moves. Only the questioning will continue,
until somebody identifies the rule by asking an appropri-
ate ultimate question. Players other than the mover (m)
may make any one of the four following types of






A challenge that the mover has made a P-
flub (that he has (P)revented the last of
the possible SOLUTIONS so that no
matter how the remaining RESOURCES
are played, it will not be possible to
write a SOLUTION).
A challenge that the mover has made an A-
flub (that he has (A)llowed a
SOLUTION to be written with at most
one more of the remaining
RESOURCES in circumstances where he
was not forced to do so).
A challenge that the mover has made a CP-
flub (that he has made a C-flub
stemming from a prior P-flub by failing
to (C)hallenge that prior P-flub or a
prior CP-flub when he could have done
so correctly).
D) CA-challenge A challenge that the mover has made a CA-
flub (that he has made a C-flub
stemming from a prior A-flub by failing
to (C)hallenge that prior A-flub or a.
prior CA-flub when he could have done
so correctly).
A challenge may be made by players other than the
mover immediately after a move is completed and,
unless somebody has challenged or declared force-out
previously, anybody can challenge after somebody asks
a question. The challenger (c) must specify what kind
of challenge she is making. The kind of challenge will
determine whether there are one or two parts to the
burden of proof and whether the mover or the
challenger shall have that burden.
4 JOIN WITH MOVER OR CHALLENGER.
The joiner (j) must join with either the challenger or
the mover. If the player that he joins has the burden of
proof, then the joiner has the same burden of proof but
he must sustain it independently. If the player that he
joins does not have the burden of proof, then neither
does the joiner.
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5 WRITE A SOLUTION.
A. If the challenge made is that the move is a P-
FLUB or a CP-FLUB, then the burden of proof is
upon the mover, and there is only one part to that
burden: to WRITE A SOLUTION-that is, a list
of letters that uses all of the RESOURCES that
have been moved to the REQUIRED section (the
required RESOURCES), none of the forbidden
RESOURCES (those moved to the FORBIDDEN
section), and as many of the permitted
RESOURCES (those moved to the PERMITTED
section) and of the remaining RESOURCES (those
not moved anywhere yet) as the player with the
burden wishes. To sustain the burden of proof the
list of letters that the mover writes (and the list
that the joiner writes if he has joined the mover on
this kind of challenge) must represent a sufficient
set of conditions to reach the GOAL(S) by the
rule.
B. If the challenge made is that the move is an A-flub
or a CA-flub, then the burden of proof is upon the
challenger, and there are two parts to that burden.
The first part is to WRITE A SOLUTION-that
is, a list of letters that uses all of the required
RESOURCES, none of the forbidden
RESOURCES, as many of the permitted
RESOURCES as the player with the burden
wishes, and at most one of the remaining
RESOURCES. For A-flub challenges the
SOLUTION must be written in the situation that
prevailed immediately after the move claimed to be
the A-flub. For CA-flub challenges the SOLUTION
must be written in the situation that prevailed
immediately after the move claimed to be the A-
flub from which the claimed CA-flub stems. To
sustain the first part of the burden of proof the list
of letters written must represent a sufficient set of
conditions to reach the GOAL(S) by the rule.
The second part of the challenger's burden of proof
is to write an OK ALTERNATIVE MOVE (a move
that does not make a P-FLUB and that also does
not allow a SOLUTION with at most one more of
the remaining RESOURCES) that the mover could
[VOL. 18:2
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have made in the situation. For A-flub challenges
the OK ALTERNATIVE MOVE must be written
in the situation that prevailed immediately before
the move from which the claimed CA-flub stems.
C. In force-outs, there is only one part to the burden
of proof: to show that a SOLUTION can be written
in the situation. To sustain the burden of proof the
list of letters written must represent a sufficient set
of conditions to reach the GOAL(S) by the rule.
6 WRITE THE RULE.
To determine whether the SOLUTION candidates
written by those who have the burden of proof (see
step 5) are in fact SOLUTIONS, it is necessary to
identify the rule. By definition a SOLUTION is any set
of RESOURCES that represent conditions which, when
met, are sufficient by the rule to reach the result(s)
designated as the GOAL(S). After a challenge is made
or a force-out declared and those with the burden of
proof have attempted to write a SOLUTION, any of
the players may attempt to write the rule. The rule
that the players are seeking will contain the sentences
for the match in the order in which they are listed in
the rule. This attempt to write the rule is optional for
each of the players, but each attempt will elicit
information about the relationship of the candidate
written to the actual rule for this match.
7 ASK AN ULTIMATE QUESTION.
Each attempt to write the rule will pose the following
question to the ANSWER SOURCE: Is this the rule?
This type of question is called an ultimate question. An
ultimate question can be asked in either of two
situations: (1) by the next player when it is her turn to
play, and (2) by all of the players after a challenge or
force-out declaration when those with the burden of
proof have finished writing their SOLUTION
candidates and rule candidates or when the next player
has finished asking his classification-relational question.
The ANSWER SOURCE will provide four kinds of
answers to the ultimate questions posed by such
attempts to identify the rule:
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D) MORE AND LESS
Your candidate is the rule or a statement
equivalent to it. You have written in
normalized form the statement that is
being sought for purposes of this match
or a statement that says the same things.
Your candidate is stronger than the rule.
It says more than the rule says.
Your candidate is weaker than the rule.
It says less than the rule says.
Your candidate is stronger in some
respects and weaker in other respects
than the rule. If a challenge has been
made or force-out declared and the
answer given to at least one of the
ultimate questions is CONGRATULA-
TIONS, then the match ends and scores
are determined by the SCORING
CHART (See Figure 6); otherwise, the
questioning continues (see step 8).
Figure 6
SCORING CHART: Summary of Scoring at End of Match
Construct statement of the rule?
Type of Ending
Challenge
Has burden of Proof
Sustains it
Does not sustain it




Sustains burden of proof












If there has not yet been a challenge
or force-out declaration, and there is
a CONGRATULATIONS answer to
an ultimate question, then the
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questioning ceases and the moves in
the match continue until somebody
challenges or declares force-out (see
steps 3 and 9). All of the players
have the option of challenging
immediately after the
CONGRATULATIONS answer.
8 ASK BOTH CLASSIFICATION AND RELATIONAL
QUESTIONS.
This type of question is called a classification-
relational question. A question of this type can be
asked in either of two situations: (1) it can be asked by
the next player when it is her turn to play, and (2) it
can be asked by the next player when it is his turn
after a challenge or force-out declaration and the
ultimate questions asked by any of the players have
been answered or could have been asked but were not.
When a classification-relational question is asked
before a challenge or force-out, the player who asked
the question must make a move after receiving her
answer. When a classification-relational question is
asked after a challenge or force-out, the play loops back
to the state, PLAYERS' ULTIMATE QUESTION,
where each of the players has a chance to try to write
the rule again, and the play continues until somebody
correctly identifies the rule to end the match.
When none of the attempts to identify the rule are
successful by an ultimate question after a challenge or
force-out declaration occurs, the next player must ask a
classification-relational question and get three answers
from the ANSWER SOURCE. The answers provide
additional information about the rule to all the players.
Each classification-relational question actually asks
three different kinds of questions:
A. CONDITIONS QUESTIONS. (preceding the >)
WITH DECIMAL POINT. (.acd > ...)
Do a, c, and d each express a condition?
WITHOUT DECIMAL POINT. (acdf > ...)
Do a, c, d, and f each express a condition, and are all of
the conditions of the rule expressed by the sentences
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that this set of letters represents?
B. RESULTS QUESTIONS. (following the >)
WITH DECIMAL POINT. (... > .ef)
Do e and f each express a result?
WITHOUT DECIMAL POINT. (... > beg)
Do b, e, and g each express a result, and are all of the
results of the rule expressed by the sentences that this
set of letters represents?
C. RELATIONAL QUESTIONS.
The letters both before and after the > sign in the
statement of the classification-relational question deter-
mine the relational question included in it. The rela-
tional question asks: Are the conditions stated, when
met, sufficient by virtue of the rule to reach all of the
results stated?
The answers to the first two types of questions will be
either YES (Y) or NO (N), and the answer to the third
type will be Y, N, or ?, where ? indicates that the ques-
tion is not meaningful in the sense that it makes an as-
sumption that is not true and, therefore, cannot be an-
swered. Thus, for example, the following classification-
relational questions should elicit the answers shown from
the ANSWER SOURCE with respect to the following
rule:
>-a---> -b




IF a, THEN [b AND (IF c OR d THEN e) AND (IF f, THEN g)].
[VOL. 18:2
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QUESTIONS ANSWERS
1 2 3
Q1. abc .de N N
Q2. .acd > Y N Y
Q3. .a > .b Y Y Y
Q4. .ac > .e Y Y Y
Q5. .ad > .e Y Y Y
Q6. .ad > .g Y Y N
Q7. .adf > .g Y Y Y
Q8. .af>.g Y Y Y
Q9. acdf > Y N Y
Q10. acdf> .e Y Y Y
Qll. .> beg Y Y N
Q12. acdf> beg Y Y Y
Question Q1 asks the following three questions:
Q1A. Do the letters a, b, and c each express a condition, and are
all of the conditions of the rule expressed by those three
letters?
The answer is N (under 1) because of each of two differ-
ent aspects of the rule:
1. The letter b does not express a condition in the rule.
2. All of the conditions of the rule are not expressed by
the three letters a, b, and c.
Q1B. Do the letters d and e each express a result?
The answer is N (under 2), because d does not express a
result in the rule.
Q1C. Do a, b, and c express a sufficient set of conditions for
reaching results d and e by virtue of the rule?
The answer is ? (under 3). Although a and c express suffi-
cient conditions for reaching result e, the question is not
meaningful, because d does not express a result; there-
fore, the question cannot be answered.
Each of the other eleven questions, similarly, asks three
questions, and the ANSWER SOURCE should give the
answers specified.
9 DECLARE FORCE-OUT.
The only player who can declare force-out is the next
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player (n). He may do so when it is his turn after a
move has been made or he has asked a question. When
a player chooses to declare force-out, the ending of the
match is set in motion; there will be no more moves.
Only the questioning will continue, until somebody
identifies what the rule is by asking an appropriate
ultimate question. Declaring force-out puts the burden
of proof on each of the players to show that a
SOLUTION can be written-that is, a list of letters
that uses all of the required RESOURCES, none of the
forbidden RESOURCES, as many of the permitted
RESOURCES as the player with the burden wishes,
and at most one of the remaining RESOURCES (see
step 5C).
10 DEFAULT BY THE RULES.
The rules that define the CLEAR LEGAL LAN-
GUAGE Game specify defaults that occur when all of the
players choose to be inactive, and none of them elects to
do any of the other alternatives that they are authorized
to do. These defaults occur only when there is but one
remaining RESOURCE and have the effect of authoriz-
ing the players to alternate asking classification-rela-
tional questions and optionally asking ultimate questions
just as they are authorized to do after somebody chal-
lenges or declares force-out.
The match ends when both the rule has been identified and
either a challenge has been made or a force-out has been de-
clared. Some of the players will be, or will have been, called
upon to write rule candidates, SOLUTIONS, and, possibly, OK
ALTERNATIVE MOVES.
When the ANSWER SOURCE indicates that one of the rule
candidates written is the same as the rule, then each of the other
rule candidates written on that turn is evaluated. If a rule candi-
date is the same as the rule, then the player who wrote it gets 25
points as indicated by the SCORING CHART. If a rule candi-
date does not match the rule, then the player who wrote it gets 0
points.
If the list of letters written sustains the burden of proof for
writing a SOLUTION and, where appropriate, sustains the bur-
den of proof for indicating an OK ALTERNATIVE MOVE,
then the writer gets either 10 or 8 points, and the player who did
not have the burden gets 6 points as indicated by the SCORING
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CHART. If the list of letters written fails to sustain some part of
the burden of proof, then the writer gets either 6 or 0 points.
Thus, in the scoring at the end of the match each player gets
two scores: one as a result of the rule candidate written and a
second one as a result of the list of letters written to sustain the
burdens of proof for writing a SOLUTION and an OK ALTER-
NATIVE MOVE. A player's total score for the match is the sum
of these two scores.
E. Complexity Levels of Matches of the CLEAR LEGAL
LANGUAGE Game
The CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game can be played at
different levels of complexity-at least the twenty-four different
levels summarized in Table 6.
TABLE 6
COMPLEXITY LEVELS OF MATCHES OF THE CLEAR LEGAL
LANGUAGE GAME
FORMS OF NORMALIZATION
CONSTITUENT SENTENCES Basic Basic Basic
OF NORMALIZED VERSION Clear Clear
OF LEGAL RULE Advanced
Listed Sentences (LS) 1 2 3
Negations of LS 4 5 6
Descriptive Parts (DP) 7 8 9
Negations of DP 10 11 12
Corresponding complexity levels of matches without the Present Version of the legal rule
available are 1', 2',... 12'.
The twelve entries in Table 6 that indicate the various levels
of complexity of matches of the CLL Game can be described in
more detail as follows:
1. With listed sentences only at basic level
2. With listed sentences only at basic or clear level
3. With listed sentences only at basic or clear or advanced
level
4. With listed sentences and/or their negations at basic
level
5. With listed sentences and/or their negations at either ba-
sic or clear level
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6. With listed sentences and/or their negations at either ba-
sic or clear or advanced level
7. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results at basic level
8. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results at either basic or clear level
9. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results at either basic or clear or ad-
vanced level
10. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results and/or the negations of
those descriptive parts at basic level
11. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results and/or the negations of
those descriptive parts at either basic or clear level
12. With listed sentences and/or their negations and/or the
descriptive parts of results and/or the negations of
those descriptive parts at either basic or clear or ad-
vanced level
There are three factors of the CLL Game that determine the
complexity of a match:
1. the availability of the Present Version of the legal
rule
2. the number of different forms of normalization that
can be used to express the normalized legal rule
3. the number of different kinds of constituent
sentences that can be used to express the normalized
legal rule
The matches become more complex when the Present Version
is unavailable and the number of forms of normalization and
kinds of constituents get larger.
The first sample match was a variation of a Complexity
LeveLl' match. It did not have the Present Version of the legal
rule available, and only the listed sentences were to be used in
expressing the basic normalized rule. In fact, only the abbrevia-
tions of those sentences were available, and that is why it is a
variation of a Complexity LeveLl' match.
The second sample match will be a moderately complex one; it
will be a LeveL5 match. This means that the Present Version of
the legal rule will be available, the normalized legal rule can be
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in either basic or clear form, and either the listed sentences or
their negations can be used in expressing it. Each negation of a
listed sentence becomes available as a permitted RESOURCE
when the letter representing the corresponding listed sentence of
that negation is moved to FORBIDDEN, PERMITTED, or RE-
QUIRED, or to GOAL(S).
F. Second Sample Match: Complexity Level_5 Using Section
361 of the Internal Revenue Code
We have stored in the ANSWER SOURCE of the computer
program of the CLL Game both basic and clear Normalized Ver-
sions of our interpretation of section 361 of the United States
Internal Revenue Code.' To construct either of these Normal-
ized Versions in playing this match, the players should use:
(1) the Present Version of section 361 of the Internal Revenue
Code,
(2) the listed sentences derived from it,
(3) the negations of those listed sentences, and
(4) whatever other information they can obtain from the AN-
SWER SOURCE by asking it ultimate questions or clas-
sification and relational questions.
26 U.S.C. § 361 PRESENT VERSION
Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss to Corporations
(a) General rule
No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a
reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reor-
ganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party
to the reorganization.
(b) Exchanges not solely in kind
(1) Gain.
If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange but for the fact
that the property received in exchange consists not only of stock or
securities permitted by subsection (a) to be received without the
recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then-
(A) if the corporation receiving such other property or
money distributes it in pursuance of the plan of reorganization,
no gain to the corporation shall be recognized from the ex-
8. I.R.C. § 361 (1982).
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change, but
(B) if the corporation receiving such other property or
money does not distribute it in pursuance of the plan of reor-
ganization, the gain, if any, to the corporation shall be recog-
nized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money
and the fair market value of such other property so received,
which is not so distributed.
(2) Loss.
If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange but for the fact
that the property received in exchange consists not only of prop-
erty permitted by subsection (a) to be received without the recog-
nition of gain or loss, but also of other property or money, then no
loss from the exchange shall be recognized.9
List of Sentences Derived from Present Version
[a: a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges prop-
erty, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, for stock
or securities in another corporation a party to the
reorganization]
[b: the exchange is solely for such stock or securities]
[c: no gain or loss shall be recognized]
[d: the property received in exchange consists not only of
stock or securities permitted by item (2) to be received
without the recognition of gain, but also of other prop-
erty or money]
[e: the corporation receiving such other property or money
distributes it in pursuance of the plan of reorganization]
[f: no gain to the corporation shall be recognized from the
exchange]
[g: the gain, if any, to the corporation shall be recognized,
but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money
and the fair market value of such other property so re-
ceived, which is not so distributed]
[h: the property received in exchange consists not only of
property permitted by item (2) to be received without the





[i: no loss from the exchange shall be recognized]
The logical structure of our interpretation of this provision
can be expressed by the parenthesized statement:
IF a THEN [(IF b THEN c) AND
(IF d THEN I IF e THEN f BUT OTHER-
WISE g I AND
(IF h THEN i)].
This same logical structure can also be expressed by the follow-
ing ARROW DIAGRAM:
>-a --- > ->-b --- > c
>-d---> >-e ---> f
- g
->-h --- > i
It can also be expressed by
Expression:
the Parenthesized Logical
a > ((b>c) & (d>((e>fBOg)) & (h>i))
These three representations of the logical structure of a Nor-
malized Version of section 361 are representations of the clear
form of normalization. The corresponding representations of the
basic form are:
IF a THEN [(IF b THEN c) AND
(IF d THEN I [IF e THEN f] AND
[IF NOT e THEN g]1) AND
(IF h THEN i)].
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This same logical structure can also be expressed by the follow-
ing ARROW DIAGRAM:
>-a---> >-b---> c
I- >-d---> - >-e---> f
I I
I ->-Ne---> g
->-h --- > i
It can also be expressed by the Parenthesized Logical
Expression:
a > ((b>c) & (d>((e>f) & (Ne>g))) & (h>i))
In the basic form the 'BUT OTHERWISE g' of the clear form
is transformed into its logically equivalent 'IF NOT e THEN g',
and corresponding changes occur in the arrow diagram and the
Parenthesized Logical Expression.
The clear normalized version of this interpretation of sec-
tion 361 written out fully is:
IF
1. a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges
property, in pursuance of the plan or reorganization,




A. the exchange is solely for such stock or securities,
THEN
B. no gain or loss shall be recognized, AND
3. IF
A. the property received in exchange consists not
only of stock or securities permitted by item (2)
to be received without the recognition of gain,
but also of other property or money,
THEN
B. IF
1. the corporation receiving such other property





2. no gain to the corporation shall be recognized
from the exchange,
BUT OTHERWISE,
3. the gain, if any, to the corporation shall be
recognized, but in an amount not in excess
of the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property so
received, which is not so distributed, AND
4. IF
A. the property received in exchange consists not
only of property permitted by item (2) to be
received without recognition of gain or loss, but
also of other property or money,
THEN
B. no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.
The basic normalized version is:
IF
1. a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges
property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization,




A. the exchange is solely for such stock or securities,
THEN
B. no gain or loss shall be recognized, AND
3. IF
A. the property received in exchange consists not
only of stock or securities permitted by item (2)
to be received without the recognition of gain,
but also of other property or money,
THEN
B. IF
1. the corporation receiving such other property
or money distributes it in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization,
THEN
2. no gain to the corporation shall be recognized
from the exchange, AND
C. IF
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1. IT IS NOT SO THAT
the corporation receiving such other
property or money distributes it in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization,
THEN
2. the gain, if any, to the corporation shall be
recognized, but in an amount not in excess
of the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property so
received, which is not so distributed, AND
4. IF
A. the property received in exchange consists not
only of property permitted by item (2) to be
received without recognition of gain or loss, but
also of other property or money,
THEN
B. no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.
The players, of course, do not have available any of the repre-
sentations of the logical structure of the interpretation of section
361 that they are seeking, nor do they have the Normalized Ver-
sions. But with the Present Version of section 361, the list of
sentences derived from it, and the knowledge that they are play-
ing a match of Complexity LeveL5, they are ready to begin
play.
P1 starts the match by setting the i as GOAL.
P2 asks: abdeh > cfgi (to which the answer is N Y N) and
then adds g to the GOAL(S).
P3 then asks: .aNeh > .i (to which the answer is Y Y Y) and
moves the h to the REQUIRED section.
The situation at this stage is:
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
1 P1 i
2 P2 abdeh>cfgi N Y N g
3 P3 .aNeh>.i Y Y Y h
The Y answer to the ... > cfgi part of P2's question indicates
that all four letters represent results, and that these four letters
represent all the results in the normalized rule, that is, no other
letters than c f g i represent results. Thus, the remaining letters,
a b d e h or their negations all must represent conditions and
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they must represent all the conditions. The N answer to the
abdeh > ... part of P2's question indicates either (1) that not all
five letters represent conditions or (2) that the five letters do not
represent all of the conditions in the normalized rule. When
combined with the Y answer to the ... > cfgi part, this informa-
tion should alert all of the players that (2) is true and that (1)
may or may not be true. For each of the five letters and its nega-
tion, at least one of the two must be a condition of the normal-
ized rule, and perhaps both of them are.
The Y answer to the .aNeh > ... part of P3's question deter-
mines that Ne (NOT e) represents one of the conditions not rep-
resented by a b d e h and, in addition, this answer determines
that a and h represent conditions. The Y answer to the ... > .i
part of P3's question yields no new information. The third Y
answer, which indicates the relationship between the specified
conditions and the specified results, determines that the fulfill-
ment of conditiona, conditionNe, and condition-h is suffi-
cient to reach result-i by the normalized rule.
P1 continues the match by asking: .dNe > .g (to which the
answer is Y Y N) and then moving the a to the PERMITTED
section.
P2 then asks: .a > .c (to which the answer is Y Y N) and then
moves the d to the FORBIDDEN section.
P1 (out of turn) challenges P2, saying that forbidding the d is
a P-flub.
P3, believing that in the normalized rule, condition d must be
fulfilled in order to reach result g, sees no SOLUTION and, so,
joins the challenger.
The mover P2 has the burden of proof and offers the set of
conditions, abcNeh, as a SOLUTION.
At this stage the moving ends, and questioning will continue
until somebody identifies the normalized rule.
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
1 P1 i
2 P2 abdeh>cfgi N Y N g
3 P3 .aNeh>.i Y Y Y h
4 .dNe>.g Y Y N a
5 P2 .a>.c Y Y N d
Action SOLUTION OK MOVE
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When the players are given the opportunity to ask ultimate
questions, P1 asks: ((a&b)>(c&(d>((e>f) & (Ne>g))))) &
(h>i) (to which the answer is MORE AND LESS).
P2 asks: ((a&b)>c) & ((d&e)>f) & (Ne>g) & (h>i) (to
which the answer is MORE).
P3 does not have a theory yet about the normalized rule and
asks no ultimate question.
It is then P1's turn to play, because he is the next player after
P3, whose turn it was when P1 interrupted the play with his P-
flub challenge. So, P1 asks the classification-relational question,
.ade .f (to which the answer is Y Y Y). This questioning part
of the play can be summarized by:
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
Ultimate Question Answer
((a&b) > (c&(d>((e>f)&(Ne>g))))) & (h>i)
7 P1 MORE AND LESS
P2 ((a&b)>c) & ((d&e)>f) & (Ne>g) & (h>i)
MORE
P3
8 P1 .ade>.f Y Y Y
This is followed by some more ultimate questioning and a classifi-
cation-relational question by P2.
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
Ultimate Question Answer
((aVb) > (c&(d>((e>f)&(Ne>g))))) & (h>i)
9 P1 MORE
P2 a > ((b>c) & ((d&e)>f) & (Ne>g) & (h>i))
MORE
P3
10 P2 .adNe>.g Y Y Y
Then the match is ended (by P2) in the next round of questions.
Move
Play Player Questions Answers F P R GOAL(S)
Ultimate Question Answer
(aVb) > (c&(d>((e>f)&(Ne>g))) & (h>i))
11 P1 MORE




Although she was caught flubbing, P2 was the first (and the
only) player to identify the normalized rule so she scored the
most points and won the match.
SCORING
Player P1 P2 P3
Rule 0 25 0
Solution 10 6 8
Total 10 31 8
The prototype version of the computer program that serves as
the ANSWER SOURCE for the CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE
Game as well as the detailed set of rules that define the game
may be obtained by sending a formatted floppy disk for the IBM
Personal Computer to Layman E. Allen, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (and the program will be sent
as soon as it is finished!).
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Significant progress has been achieved in helping to improve
the understanding of drafting 'and interpreting legal rules. To
indicate the need for extending current instruction in legal writ-
ing to include skills of logical analysis, this article analyzes in
excruciating detail the dual richness of the logical structure of
legal rules. The article also describes a currently available com-
puter program, NORMALIZER, and demonstrates how the pro-
gram can assist analysts in normalizing the expression of legal
rules. The article then describes the beginning versions of the
CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game, designed to help instruct
drafters and interpreters of legal language in the handling of log-
ical structure; a pair of sample matches illustrate the CLEAR
LEGAL LANGUAGE Game. This is a fruitful beginning of a
task of substantial proportions; clearly, much remains to be
done. What we now see looming on the horizon is only a part of
the emerging picture of what needs to be developed in the
future.
The analysis of the richness of the logical structure can use-
fully be extended in various ways. The number of possible dif-
ferent rules that can be written from a limited number of condi-
tions and a limited number of results should be analyzed for
more than merely two conditions and two results. Deeper insight
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into the ways in which rules with different meanings are pro-
duced by changes in logical structure can be achieved if the
analysis is pushed at least as far as to the cases of four condi-
tions and four results. The analysis of the richness of logical
structure in the second respect, the multiplicity of interpreta-
tions of natural language terminology used to express structure,
should also be extended. The terms 'shall not', 'may', and 'may
not' should be examined in detail the way that 'shall' was in this
article. Additional terms used to express normative ideas such as
'directive' also need investigation. Perhaps the deepest insights
into complexities of normative ideas will result from efforts to
completely formalize a modernized version of the Hohfeldian
fundamental legal conceptions. Significant partial formalization
of the concepts of RIGHT, DUTY, PRIVILEGE, and
NORIGHT have already been achieved,10 but the harder task of
adequate formalization of POWER, LIABILITY, DISABILITY,
and IMMUNITY remains a challenge.
The current version of the NORMALIZER program can use-
fully be extended in various ways, also. At present, parts of
sentences can be handled by treating them the way that com-
plete sentences are treated, but more effective analysis will be
possible when the program's capability for handling within-sen-
tence logical structure is completed. The process of normalizing
a legal rule can also be made easier for a human analyst by in-
creasing the encyclopedia of defined structural terms that the
NORMALIZER program can access. Additional defined be-
tween-sentence structural terms expand the variety of advanced
forms of normalization, as well as simplify the normalization of a
rule by making the defined terms and the natural language
terms more similar. Defined within-sentence structural terms
will permit a more complete disambiguation of existing legal
rules-a clarification of the within-sentence logical structure in
addition to the between-sentence logical structure that is han-
dled by basic, clear, and advanced forms of normalization. The
human analyst's most difficult task, the formulating of questions
about the ambiguities of the logical structure of the Present Ver-
sions of legal rules, can probably also be assisted significantly by
additional facilities in the program to help generate such
questions.
The official set of rules that define the current version of the
CLEAR LEGAL LANGUAGE Game still need to be completed,
10. See Allen, Formalizing Hohfeldian Analysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses of
'Legal Right': A Powerful Lens for the Electronic Age, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 428 (1974).
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as does the computer program for its ANSWER SOURCE. It is
possible to specify how these can be used as a solitaire version of
the game (a puzzle), and this needs to be done. The current ver-
sion of the game deals only with the between-sentence logical
structure; it needs to be extended to make the handling of deon-
tic and Hohfeldian terminology of the within-sentence structure
a significant part of playing a match.
Experience in using such a game and its associated puzzles as
part of a course or workshop will also increase our understand-
ing of how such tools can be employed most effectively. We wel-
come the cooperation of any teachers or learners who would like
to participate in a network of sharing such experiences. As to
why anybody should be motivated to do so, the implications of
recognizing the richness of the logical structure of legal rules and
having available precise language tools for dealing with it de-
serve repetition. The very quality of thinking about legal rules is
likely to be profoundly affected by having a realistic sense of the
complexity of what is involved and having an adequate language
in which to do such thinking. Wherever legal drafters intend to
be clear about the logical relationships involved in legal rules,
more adequate tools to facilitate achieving such clarity will exist.
Whenever interpreters of existing legal rules are faced with such
rules written entirely in natural language not enriched by de-
fined structural terminology, detection of alternative logical in-
terpretations will be greatly enhanced. Anyone confronted with
the vast number of different possibilities will be more likely to
appreciate the usefulness of a language rich enough to precisely
distinguish among those possibilities. Regulations can be more
informative; contracts can better achieve what parties want;
statutes can more adequately serve their intended purposes;
wherever better writing can enhance the quality of legal life, the
analysis of the logical structure of legal writing and the CLEAR
LEGAL LANGUAGE Game are a means for approaching that
goal.
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